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THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
TAYLOR J. PHILLIPS*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) have vigorously enforced the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign
government officials, and the statute provides for significant civil and
criminal sanctions. Settling and remediating violations can cost corporate
defendants millions, with several corporate enforcement actions exceeding
$100 million in sanctions. Moreover, enforcement actions related to the
FCPA often are not brought until many years after the alleged violations.
Because the massive potential liabilities associated with an FCPA violation may not manifest themselves until years after the violation occurred,
prospective corporate acquirers have become acutely sensitive to the risk
of “buying” an FCPA liability during a merger or an acquisition. Traditionally, an acquirer could avoid liabilities of the seller by structuring the
acquisition as an asset purchase. Under the law of most U.S. jurisdictions,
a court will not usually look beyond the allocation of liabilities in an asset
purchase agreement, even when the acquirer purchases substantially all of
the assets of the seller.
Despite this general rule, even asset purchase agreements cannot contract around certain liabilities that arise from federal law. In several cases,
the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have imposed liability on
good faith, arm’s-length asset purchasers through the federal common law
of successor liability.
In the FCPA context, there is no precedent directly on point. Influential
guidance from the DOJ and SEC, however, emphasizes “successor liability”
enforcement actions while failing to distinguish between companies that are
“successors” by reason of a merger and “successors” by reason of an asset
*
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purchase.1 This silence by enforcers may lead overly conservative acquirers
to abandon transactions out of an unfounded (but understandable) fear of
being held liable for the violations of the seller, even when acquisitions
would be socially and economically beneficial and likely could be accomplished without FCPA successor liability through an asset purchase.2
This Article concludes that asset purchasers typically cannot be held
civilly liable for the pre-acquisition FCPA violations of sellers because the
rule of decision for successor liability in FCPA cases is determined by state,
not federal law, and the law of most states does not impose successor liability on arm’s-length asset purchasers. This conclusion is even stronger with
respect to criminal FCPA liability because the remedial policy rationales
that underlie expansive civil successor liability doctrines are not present in
criminal law.

1

See Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and Enforcement Division
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 28 (Nov. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Resource Guide], available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
2
The lack of clarity from enforcers appears to have led a number of large law firms to
assert, in publicly available articles, newsletters, and presentations, that an asset purchaser
can be liable for the FCPA violations of a seller. These conclusions may have been influenced by the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which implies that criminal
history transfers when one company purchases the ongoing business of another through
an asset purchase. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5 cmt. n.6 (2013).
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I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Generally
The FCPA, codified as part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the “Exchange Act”), includes anti-bribery provisions and accounting
provisions. The anti-bribery provisions prohibit corruptly offering anything
of value to a foreign government official for the purpose of influencing the
official to assist the offeror in the obtaining or retaining of business.3
Companies that are “issuers” within the meaning of the Exchange Act
also must comply with the accounting provisions of the FCPA.4 The booksand-records provisions of the FCPA require issuers to “make and keep
books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”5
Issuers are also required to maintain a system of internal compliance controls that “provide[] reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in
accordance” with generally accepted accounting principles.6 Collectively,
the books-and-records and internal controls provisions are referred to as the
accounting provisions.
The FCPA is enforced by the DOJ and the SEC.7 The DOJ handles
criminal enforcement, as well as civil enforcement against non-issuer companies and their officers, directors, employees, and agents.8 The SEC is
authorized to bring civil suits against issuers and their officers, directors,
employees, and agents.9
The DOJ and SEC can seek devastating sanctions for FCPA violations.
For individuals, sanctions for violating the anti-bribery provisions can include imprisonment of up to five years and fines of up to $100,000 per
violation.10 For companies, anti-bribery sanctions may result in fines of up
to $2,000,000 per violation.11 Under the Alternative Fines Act, courts can
3

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a) (2012).
See id. § 78c(a)(8) (defining “issuer”).
5
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
6
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
7
There is no private right of action under the FCPA. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
915 F.2d 1024, 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
8
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 4.
9
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 4–5.
10
§§ 78ff(c)(2)(A), 78dd-2(g)(2)(A). A willful violation of the accounting provisions
can result in a fine of $5,000,000 and imprisonment up to twenty years. § 78ff(a).
11
§§ 78ff(c)(1)(A), 78dd-2(g)(1)(A). A willful violation of the accounting provisions
can result in a fine of $25,000,000. § 78ff(a).
4
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impose penalties equal to twice the benefit gained by the defendant in making the improper payment.12 Furthermore, although the statute of limitations
for a substantive violation of the FCPA is five years,13 the government has
used numerous methods to extend the time in which it can prosecute an
FCPA-related offense,14 resulting in defendants being penalized for conduct
many years from the date of the alleged violation.15
Although the FCPA does not create a private right of action, companies
often face more than just the fines and penalties assessed by the government.16 Collateral consequences of an FCPA conviction may include denial
of export privileges and debarment from doing business with the United
States government.17 In the wake of disclosing FCPA investigations, public
companies frequently suffer stock drops and concomitant shareholder suits.18
Additionally, the professional fees and costs associated with an FCPA
investigation may be just as significant as the fines and penalties themselves. For example, in the largest FCPA settlement in history, Siemens
resolved alleged FCPA violations for $800 million.19 In addition to paying
$800 million to the U.S. Treasury, Siemens paid its attorneys, accountants,
and other professionals $1 billion in fees and costs related to the investigation, including $100 million for document review alone.20 The staggering
12

18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2012).
See SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462’s catchall five year statute of limitations in an FCPA case).
14
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3292 (2012) (permitting a court to toll the statute of limitations
for up to three years if the government meets certain conditions, including requesting information from a foreign government). Also, charging conspiracy—a continuing offense—
permits the government to bring charges within five years of the last overt act committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 227 (1946).
15
See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 4, United States v. Total, S.A., No. 1:13cr-239 (E.D. Va. May 29, 2013) (noting that “most of the underlying conduct occurred in the
1990s and early 2000s,” more than a decade before the criminal information was filed).
16
See O’Melveny & Myers LLP, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: AN O’MELVENY
HANDBOOK 26–28 (6th ed. 2009), available at http://www.omm.com/files/upload/OMelveny
Myers_Sixth_Edition_FCPA_Handbook.pdf.
17
See 22 C.F.R. §§ 126.7(a)(3)–(4), 120.27(a)(6) (2014); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (2013).
18
See Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation
Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1223–27
(2012).
19
Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2012), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443862604578028462294611352.
20
Nathan Vardi, Feds Charge Former Siemens Executives with Bribery, FORBES
(Dec. 13, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2011/12/13/feds-charge
-former-siemens-executives-with-bribery/; Palazzolo, supra note 19.
13
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level of professional fees incurred during FCPA investigations is driven
partly by the multijurisdictional nature of anti-corruption investigations.
By definition, an alleged anti-bribery offense involves conduct related to
another country, and thus often requires the retention of professionals in
multiple jurisdictions.21 Furthermore, upon discovering a potential FCPA
violation in one jurisdiction, questionable payments in other jurisdictions
or business units may be identified.22 As the investigation expands to other
jurisdictions—and sometimes other jurisdictions’ enforcement authorities—
costs go up.23
The high stakes and high costs often lead corporate defendants to resolve alleged FCPA violations out of court.24 In addition to the monetary
cost of a settlement, however, defendants may continue to face significant
consequences. As part of negotiated resolutions, the government sometimes
requires corporate defendants to retain monitors for one to three years
after the resolutions.25 A monitor typically has access to corporate books,
21

Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 19.
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 15 (Sept. 5, 2013)
(“The Audit Committee ... is conducting an internal investigation into, among other things,
alleged violations of the [FCPA] ... in connection with foreign subsidiaries, including WalMart de México .... Inquiries or investigations regarding allegations of potential FCPA
violations have been commenced in a number of foreign markets where the Company operates, including, but not limited to, Brazil, China[,] and India.”); Embraer S.A., Report
of Foreign Private Issuer (Form 6-K) 9 (Mar. 13, 2013) (“We received a subpoena from
the SEC in September, 2010 .... In response to this SEC-issued subpoena and associated
inquiries into the possibility of non-compliance with [FCPA], we retained outside counsel
to conduct an internal investigation on transactions carried out in three specific countries.
Further, the Company has voluntarily expanded the scope of the internal investigation to
include two additional countries ....”).
23
See, e.g., Diebold, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 6 (Feb. 14, 2011) (“As previously disclosed, Diebold is conducting a global internal review of its compliance with the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) .... As a result of the internal review progressing to more complex operations located in broader geographies, as well as complying with
requests from regulators, costs associated with the FCPA review increased substantially in
the fourth quarter.”).
24
See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2
(2010) (written testimony of Andrew Weissmann) [hereinafter Weissmann Testimony],
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG-111shrg66
921.pdf (“Commercial organizations are rarely positioned to litigate an FCPA enforcement action to its conclusion and the risk of serious jail time for individual defendants
has led most to plead.”).
25
See generally F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant, & Veronica S. Root,
Somebody’s Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better, 13 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 321 (2011).
22
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records, and employees, and reports directly to the government.26 The defendant, of course, is obligated to pay the monitor’s professional fees.27
B. Recent Developments in FCPA Enforcement
Although the FCPA was enacted in 1977, enforcement has exploded in
the past ten years.28 As touted by the DOJ, nine of the top ten resolutions
(by settlement value) were reached between 2009 and 2013.29 By 2010,
FCPA fines comprised half of all DOJ Criminal Division penalties.30 In
2013, the chief of the DOJ’s FCPA unit said, “[w]e have more prosecutors
today than we ever have. More agents today than we ever have. We have a
greater caseload today than we ever have.”31 The aggressive enforcement
of the FCPA has spanned the administrations of both George W. Bush and
Barack Obama;32 absent legislative or judicial intervention, it appears to
be a permanent part of the business law landscape.
26

See id. at 353–54 (“Because the monitor is independent, actively reviews the company’s practices, and reports to the government, the monitor might discover and reveal
previously undisclosed wrongdoing. Any such wrongdoing may or may not be FCPA
related, but if found by a monitor, it can lead to further scrutiny by the government and
additional penalties.”).
27
See id. at 371–72 (noting the importance of negotiating a budget with the monitor
“to prevent the engagement from becoming the proverbial ‘gravy train.’”).
28
See generally Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and
Acquisition Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
247, 247–53 (2010) (collecting enforcement actions); see also The Accomplishments of
the U.S. Department of Justice 2001–2009, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 31 (2009), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/doj-accomplishments.pdf (“[T]he Department
brought more FCPA prosecutions in [2005–2009] than in all of the previous 26 years dating
back to passage of the FCPA statute in 1977.”).
29
Accomplishments Under the Leadership of Attorney General Eric Holder, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/accomplishments/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014)
(“Since 2009, the Department has entered into more than 50 corporate resolutions, including nine of the 10 largest resolutions ever in terms of penalties, resulting in approximately
$2.63 billion in monetary penalties.”).
30
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) [hereinafter
June 14, 2011 Hearing], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers
/112th/112-47_66886.PDF.
31
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2013 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE (Gibson, Dunn &
Dunn & Crutcher LLP Publications, Wash. D.C.), July 8, 2013, at 20, available at http://
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.pdf (citing
Charles Duross, Remarks at the 27th Annual Nat’l Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 7,
2013)).
32
See Shearman & Sterling LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN
THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2–6 (Shearman & Sterling

96

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:089

With the frequency of enforcement increasing so dramatically, one
might expect FCPA case law to develop at a parallel pace. That has not
happened. As noted above, the devastating consequences of FCPA violations have led many corporate targets to resolve potential liability out of
court.33 Companies “commonly prefer to pay huge penalties through deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements
(NPAs) rather than actually litigate the dispute under the public eye.”34
Even the co-director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement has acknowledged that the frequency of these settlements has resulted in a dearth
of precedent interpreting the FCPA.35 This lack of precedent, in turn, results
in corporate conduct being preemptively shaped as much by the enforcement positions of the DOJ and SEC as by legislation, regulation, or judicial
decisions.36 In an attempt to read the prosecutorial tea leaves, companies
often look to past enforcement actions of the DOJ and SEC. As a representative for criminal defense attorneys described it in her 2011 testimony
to the House of Representatives, “[b]ecause there has been so little judicial
scrutiny of FCPA enforcement theories, right now the FCPA essentially
means whatever the DOJ and SEC says it means.”37
LLP, N.Y.C., N.Y., 2014), available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services
/FCPA/2014/FCPADigestTPFCPA010614.pdf.
33
See Weissmann Testimony, supra note 24, at 3 n.8.
34
R. Zachary Torres-Fowler, Undermining ICSID: How the Global Antibribery Regime
Impairs Investor-State Arbitration, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 995, 1007 (2012).
35
See Andrew Ceresney, Co-Director of the Division of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Keynote Address at the International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech
/1370540392284#.UpJ61MSsim4 (“[C]ases against individuals have also fleshed out some
important areas of FCPA law, which—as many of you know—is not well developed.”).
36
See Defining the Problem and Scope of Over-Criminalization and OverFederalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 18 (2013) [hereinafter Terwilliger Testimony] (statement of
fmr. Deputy Att’y Gen. George J. Terwilliger, III), available at http://judiciary.house.gov
/_cache/files/e886416b-82d6-43f9-8d5d-68c44fc590cd/113-44-81464.pdf (“[B]ecause the
FCPA is largely enforced exclusively by the Department of Justice and Securities Exchange
Commission, beyond the scrutiny of judicial oversight, enforcement is dependent largely on
prosecutorial discretion ....”); June 14, 2011 Hearing, supra note 30, at 2 (“The result is a
shortage of court decisions determining the limits of the law. Companies must then analyze
cases prosecuted by the Justice Department and the settlements reached to determine how
to do business in foreign markets.”).
37
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 46 (2011) (testimony of
Shana-Tara Regon, Dir. While Collar Crime Policy, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.pdf;
Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 909–10 (2010).
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Unlike virtually every other federal criminal statute, however, the FCPA
contains a mechanism through which U.S. companies and individuals may
seek advisory opinions from the DOJ—the Opinion Procedure. 38 The
Opinion Procedure allows companies to disclose prospective conduct to the
DOJ.39 Upon receipt of all relevant facts regarding the prospective conduct,
the DOJ issues a publicly available release opining as to whether the prospective conduct would violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.40
Although Opinion Procedure releases are not binding on the DOJ with respect to anyone other than the requestor, they have become an additional
source of guidance for companies.41 As a matter of discretion, the SEC also
honors the DOJ’s Opinion Procedure releases.42 Unfortunately, the Opinion
Procedure has been used infrequently.43
Given the limited use of the Opinion Procedure and the lack of judicial
precedent, the private bar44 and the industry45 have testified to Congress that
the FCPA should be reformed to clarify its ambiguities. Perhaps in an attempt to forestall legislative changes, the DOJ and SEC released a 120-page
Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in November
2012 (the “Resource Guide”).46 The Resource Guide describes itself as “an
unprecedented undertaking by DOJ and SEC to provide the public with detailed information about our FCPA enforcement approach and priorities.”47
38

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(e), 78dd-2(e) (2012); 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.1–80.16 (2013).
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 86.
40
28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2013).
41
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 87 (“In order to provide non-binding guidance to the
business community, DOJ makes versions of its opinions publicly available on its website.”).
42
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 119 n.398.
43
In the thirty-four years since the first release under the Review Procedure (a predecessor to the Opinion Procedure), the DOJ has issued only sixty-one releases—less than
one every six months. Even in the last decade of vigorous FCPA enforcement, the DOJ
has issued only twenty-two releases. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV., Review
Procedure Releases, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/review/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2014); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV., Opinion Procedure Releases,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
44
See Terwilliger Testimony, supra note 36, at 18–19.
45
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 20 (2011)
[hereinafter Mukasey Testimony] (testimony of fmr. Att’y Gen. Michael B. Mukasey),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/112th/112-47_66886.PDF;
Andrew Weissmann and Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 11 (Oct.
2010), http://openairblog.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/us-chamber-of-comm-amending-the
-fcpa.pdf; Weissmann Testimony, supra note 24, at 4.
46
See generally Resource Guide, supra note 1.
47
Id. (foreword by Lanny A. Breuer and Robert S. Khuzami).
39
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It “addresses a wide variety of topics, including ... what constitute[s] proper
and improper gifts, travel and entertainment expenses ... how successor
liability applies in the mergers and acquisitions context ... and the different
types of civil and criminal resolutions available in the FCPA context.”48
The business community has responded with guarded appreciation, while
continuing to press for additional clarification on the enforcement positions of the DOJ and SEC with respect to issues such as corporate criminal
liability, parent-subsidiary liability, and successor liability.49
C. Mergers, Acquisitions, and the FCPA
In a 2003 Opinion Procedure release, the DOJ first suggested that an
acquiring company could be liable for the pre-acquisition FCPA violations
of the acquired company.50 Subsequent cases confirmed the DOJ and SEC’s
willingness to bring FCPA enforcement actions against buyers predicated
on the pre-acquisition conduct of targets.51
For example, in the $900 million merger between a subsidiary of General
Electric Company (GE) and InVision Technologies Inc. (InVision), an internal investigation during due diligence revealed potential violations of the
FCPA.52 The conduct was self-disclosed to the DOJ and SEC, which eventually settled with InVision for $800,000 and $500,000, respectively.53 The
DOJ also required InVision to retain a compliance monitor.54 Moreover,
although the DOJ did not charge GE, it required GE to enter into an NPA,
pursuant to which GE agreed to continue InVision as “a separate legal entity subject to investigation and prosecution” for the duration of InVision’s
obligations to the DOJ.55 Notably, the DOJ stated that “in consideration”
for GE’s cooperation, incorporation of the merged InVision subsidiary into
GE’s compliance program, and other consideration, the DOJ would “not
48

Id.
See Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Hon. Lanny A. Breuer and George
S. Canellos 1, 3–5 (Feb. 19, 2013), available at http://www.ethic-intelligence.com images
/documents/legislation_reference_texts/2013_Coalition_Letter_to_DOJ_and_SEC_re_Guid
ance.pdf (regarding FCPA Resource Guide).
50
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION
PROCEDURE RELEASE 03-01 (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal
/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2003/0301.pdf.
51
See generally Grimm, supra note 28, at 305–22 (collecting cases).
52
Id. at 309.
53
Id. at 310–11.
54
Id. at 310.
55
Non-Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 2, In re InVision Techs., (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invision
tech-agree-ge.pdf.
49
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prosecute GE or any successor or subsidiary ... under the FCPA.” 56 Of
course, this strongly implies that, but for the NPA, the DOJ could have
filed charges against GE.
Another frequently cited example of FCPA liability following an acquisition is the purchase of Latin Node, Inc. (Latin Node) by eLandia
International, Inc. (eLandia). 57 In 2007, eLandia acquired Latin Node
through a stock purchase with Latin Node’s parent.58 After the transaction
closed, eLandia quickly discovered and disclosed potentially corrupt payments made by Latin Node to government officials before the acquisition.59
Notwithstanding the intervening acquisition and eLandia’s cooperation,
however, the DOJ required eLandia’s new subsidiary to plead guilty to
violating the FCPA.60 In exchange for Latin Node’s guilty plea, the DOJ
agreed not to file “additional criminal charges against Defendant ... or its
parent corporation ... eLandia International, Inc.”61 eLandia also agreed to
provide the funds necessary to pay Latin Node’s fine.62 On a practical level,
the FCPA liabilities caused eLandia to write off its investment and discontinue Latin Node’s operations.63
Finally, in a matter that predated the Resource Guide, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Watts Water Technologies, Inc. (Watts Water) acquired the
business of Changsha Valve, a Chinese company, through an asset purchase.64 Prior to the acquisition, Changsha Valve purportedly maintained a
“sales incentive policy,” pursuant to which it allegedly made improper
payments to employees of Chinese instrumentalities.65 The subsidiary of
Watts Water allegedly continued these practices after acquiring the assets
of Changsha Valve.66
After Watts Water discovered and self-disclosed the potential FCPA
violations, the SEC brought an enforcement action against Watts Water for
its post-acquisition conduct, but not for the pre-acquisition conduct.67 The
56

Id.
Information at 10–11, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 1:09-cr-20239-PCH,
2009 WL 1423436 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2009).
58
eLandia International, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 12–13 (Aug. 20, 2007).
59
Information, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., supra note 57, at 2–3.
60
Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 1:09-cr-20239-PCH (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 3, 2009).
61
Id. at 4.
62
Id. at 3.
63
eLandia International, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22–23 (Apr. 1, 2009).
64
See Watts Water Tech., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 18 (Nov. 7, 2011).
65
In re Watts Water Tech., Inc. and Leesen Chang, SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 314585, 2, 4 (Oct. 13, 2011).
66
Id. at 3–4.
67
Id. at 7.
57
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DOJ apparently declined to bring any enforcement action.68 There is no
evidence that Changsha Valve was subject to the FCPA, however, and thus
its pre-acquisition conduct could not give rise to liability, regardless of the
acquisition structure.69
After Watts Water self-disclosed the potential violations, however, it
agreed to sell its subsidiary that owned the Changsha Valve assets to another company. That company then sold the Changsha Valve assets to
China Valves Technology, Inc. (China Valves).70 The SEC subsequently
sent a letter with the following request to China Valves:
You have indicated that there is no agreement with [Watts Water] regarding the investigation into possible improper payments to foreign government officials by employees of Changsha Valve. Therefore, please
confirm and revise your future filings, beginning with your Form 10-Q
for the period ended June 30, 2011, to indicate, if true, that you have
assumed full responsibility for any potential liabilities that may arise as
a result of this matter.71

On its face, the SEC’s letter would seem to indicate that the SEC asked
China Valves to confirm that it would have successor liability in connection
with the Changsha Valve transaction—indeed, that is what China Valves
confirmed.72 On September 29, 2014, however, the SEC filed a complaint
against China Valves based in part on its failure to disclose that the intermediate entity in the transaction with Watt Water was merely a “straw
man” created by China Valves to disguise the transaction.73
In light of some of these cases, the call to reform the FCPA identified
successor liability as an issue of paramount concern. For example, in former
Attorney General Michael Mukasey’s congressional testimony, he stated that
68

Id. at 7–8.
See Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28 (“Successor liability does not, however,
create liability where none existed before. For example, if an issuer were to acquire a
foreign company that was not previously subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, the mere
acquisition of that foreign company would not retroactively create FCPA liability for the
acquiring issuer.”).
70
In re China Valves Tech. Sec. Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15017, at *5–6
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013).
71
Letter from Rufus Decker, SEC Div. of Corporate Fin. Accounting Branch Chief,
to Jianbao Wang, Chief Exec. Officer of China Valves Tech, Inc. (June 22, 2011) (on file
with SEC) (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/108
0360/000000000011038326/filename1.pdf.
72
China Valves responded that it would “have successor liability to assume full responsibility for any potential liabilities.” Letter from Jianbao Wang, Chief Exec. Officer of
China Valves Tech. Inc., to Rufus Decker, SEC Div. of Corporate Fin. Accounting Branch
Chief (July 12, 2011) (on file with SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar
/data/1080360/000120445911001877/filename1.htm.
73
Complaint, SEC v. China Valves Tech., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01630 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2014).
69
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criminal successor liability under the FCPA “is at odds with the basic principles and goals of criminal law, including punishing only culpable conduct
or deterring offending behavior.” 74 Given this conflict, former Deputy
Attorney General George Terwilliger proposed to Congress a “repose of
post-acquisition due diligence,” pursuant to which an acquirer could investigate and disclose to the government any pre-acquisition violations, in exchange for immunity from penalty.75 Andrew Weissmann, a former DOJ
prosecutor testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,76 noted
some of the issues touched upon in this Article (including the intersection of
federal and state successor liability law) before requesting that Congress
place “clear parameters for ... successor liability under the FCPA ....”77
As noted above, the Resource Guide appears to have been promulgated
in response to pressures from the private bar and industry to clarify the
government’s enforcement positions.78 With respect to successor liability,
the Resource Guide states generally that “just as with any other statute, DOJ
and SEC look to principles of ... successor liability in evaluating corporate
liability.”79 Curiously, however, the Resource Guide continues to opine that
“[a]s a general legal matter, when a company ... acquires another company,
the successor company assumes the predecessor company’s liabilities.”80
As discussed in the next section of this Article, the default rule for asset
purchases is successor nonliability.81 Thus, the Resource Guide’s lack of
specificity regarding asset purchases may leave its readers with the misimpression that any acquisition structure necessarily results in the assumption
of FCPA liabilities by the acquiring company.
74

See Mukasey Testimony, supra note 45, at 30.
See Terwilliger Testimony, supra note 36, at 19.
76
See Andrew Weissmann Appointed as FBI’s General Counsel, FBI (Oct. 26, 2011),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/andrew-weissmann-appointed
-as-fbis-general-counsel (announcing Weissmann’s appointment to be the General Counsel to
the FBI, which investigates potential FCPA violations).
77
Weissmann Testimony, supra note 24, at 12.
78
See generally Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the 26th
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Nov. 8,
2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-111108
.html (discussing lobbying efforts of U.S. Chamber of Commerce and others, and noting
that “in 2012, in what I hope will be a useful and transparent aid, we expect to release
detailed new guidance on the Act’s criminal and civil enforcement provisions”).
79
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 27; see also Philip Urofsky, Hee Won (Marina)
Moon & Jennifer Rimm, The Fallacies of Reform, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1175 (2012)
(“[T]he government, applying traditional liability theories, has taken the position that a
mere change in ownership does not extinguish liability.”).
80
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28.
81
George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 FLA. ST.
U. BUS. REV. 9, 11 (2007); see infra Part II.
75
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II. SUCCESSOR NONLIABILITY AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The text of the FCPA does not provide for successor liability, which
means that if it is to apply, the doctrine must be derived from elsewhere.
As discussed below, federal common law is the most likely vector for the
application of successor liability doctrines. But before addressing how successor liability may apply through the federal common law, it is important
to review what successor liability is and what it is not.
A. Traditional Common Law of the States
Pursuant to the laws of virtually every U.S. jurisdiction, a company that
acquires the assets of another generally does not assume the liabilities.82
The policy rationales for the rule of nonliability are straightforward. First,
the nonliability rule appeals to fundamental notions of fairness: “[n]o person should be bound by contractual obligations that they have not voluntarily assumed. Similarly, no person should be liable for torts they did not
commit.”83 Second, a rule of nonliability increases certainty in the marketplace and recognizes the importance of the free alienability of property; in
contrast, a broad rule of successor liability would have a “chilling effect on
potential purchasers who might acquire the assets of a foreclosed business
and find themselves liable for debts they never intended to assume.”84
Notwithstanding the general rule of successor nonliability, courts traditionally have recognized exceptions when:
x
x
x
x
82

the acquirer expressly or impliedly assumes the liability;
the transaction is an attempt to fraudulently evade liability;
the acquiring company’s business constitutes a “mere continuation” of the seller’s business; or
the transaction amounts to a de facto merger.85

WILLIAM M. FLETCHER ET. AL, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 7122, (rev. vol. 2008); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Ultimate Independence
of the Federal Courts: Defying the Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal Common
Law Powers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 425, 463 (2004) (“This rule of non-liability for asset
acquisitions arose out of the bona fide purchaser rule, and was designed to promote the
free alienability of property and to enhance the efficiency of commercial transactions.”
(citation omitted)).
83
John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 381 (2011).
84
Glentel, Inc. v. Wireless Ventures, LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (N.D. Ind. 2005)
(citation omitted).
85
Matheson, supra note 83, at 383; see, e.g., Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co.,
337 Fed. App’x 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Kentucky law of successor nonliability
and noting that it recognized these four exceptions); Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats,
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One scholar has noted that all of the traditional exceptions (other than
assumption of liability) are simply different iterations of the same concern:
that a company’s owners will use manipulations of the corporate form to
defraud creditors.86 For clarity, however, all four exceptions are discussed
briefly below.
The first “exception”—express or implied assumption of liabilities—
simply restates hornbook contract principles and thus is not an exception
at all.87 When an asset purchase agreement provides that the purchaser will
assume certain liabilities, the purchaser naturally will be responsible for
those liabilities.88 Relatedly, “[c]ourts generally find purchasers have impliedly assumed liabilities when ‘the conduct or representations relied
upon ... evidence an intention on the part of the purchasing company to
assume the old corporation’s liabilities in whole or in part.’”89 For either
branch of this “exception” to apply, however, the purchaser must intend to
assume the liabilities.
The second exception, fraud, is also straightforward. When a company
fraudulently transfers its assets to avoid its creditors, courts will ignore the
transaction and hold the successor liable for the company’s debts.90 For
the fraud exception to apply, typically the defendants must have deceived
the plaintiff.91
The “mere continuation” and “de facto merger” exceptions are closely
related. 92 Although the formulations vary slightly by jurisdiction, they
294 F.3d 640, 649 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that Florida follows general rule of successor
nonliability, but “recognizes all four of the traditionally-accepted exceptions”); Eagle Pac.
Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(noting that though “[t]he general rule in Washington is that a corporation purchasing the
assets of another is not liable for the seller’s debts,” these four exceptions apply).
86
See Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745,
769 (2003) (“[T]he list of traditional factors for a finding of de facto merger or mere
continuation describes a transfer and a transferee that have no purpose but to defraud
creditors.”) (citation omitted).
87
Matheson, supra note 83, at 384.
88
FLETCHER, supra note 82.
89
Matheson, supra note 83, at 386.
90
Id. at 384.
91
See, e.g., Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry Co., 215 F.3d 182, 192 (1st Cir.
2000) (“We have found no evidence of misrepresentation or deceit by the defendants that
either induced [their creditor] to act contrary to his best interests or fail to take action that
could have resulted in the payment of all or a part of the commissions due.”).
92
Greenway Ctr., Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co., 369 Fed. App’x 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2010)
(noting that “courts treat de facto merger and [mere] continuation identically”); Douglas
v. Stamco, 363 Fed. App’x 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he de facto merger and mere
continuation exceptions ... are often regarded as so similar as to be considered a single
exception.”) (citation omitted).
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typically involve elements or factors similar to the following: (1) continuity
of shareholders and ownership, management, personnel, physical location,
and business operations; (2) whether sufficient consideration was given, particularly whether stock was given in exchange; (3) whether the predecessor
ceased business operations and was dissolved shortly after the new company was formed; (4) whether the successor company paid any outstanding
debts on behalf of the previous company in order to continue business without interruption; (5) the buyer’s intent or purpose when the new company
was formed; and (6) whether the successor held itself out to the public as a
continuation of the previous company.93
These exceptions “embod[y] a policy that corporations should not be able
to avoid liability by simply changing their form or name.”94 In short, the
mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions effectively allow a creditor
to rely on objective indicators of fraudulent intent to avoid liability, rather
than being forced to prove such intent pursuant to the fraud exception.95
Critically, however, both exceptions generally require continuity of ownership between the seller and the purchaser.96
93

Dixstar v. GenTec Equip., No. 3:02CV-45-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7201, at *12
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 11, 2004) (accord. Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 337 Fed.
App’x 480, 484 (6th Cir. 2009)) (collecting cases).
94
Matheson, supra note 83, at 392. This, of course, is the policy in the context of tort
and contract liabilities. The de facto merger doctrine originated not as a means to secure compensation for injured third parties, but to protect dissenting shareholders’ rights when controlling shareholders would attempt to effect a merger without the dissenters’ approvals.
See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., 182 A.2d 22, 24–25 (Del. Ch. 1962).
95
See Reilly, supra note 86, at 769; see also Ed Peters Jewelry Co., 215 F.3d at 190
(calling the mere continuation exception “circumstantial”). Also note that the mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions arguably are not subject to the particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that is applicable to the fraud exception. See
Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 86, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that
fraud exception argument would fail on 9(b) grounds, but not applying 9(b) to de facto
merger exception analysis).
96
See C.T. Charlton & Assocs. v. Thule, Inc., 541 Fed. App’x 549, 554 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“Under the ‘mere continuity’ exception, courts will look to the totality of the circumstances but only if the ‘indispensable’ requirements of common ownership and a transfer of
substantially all assets are met first.”) (citation omitted); Cargo Partner, 207 F. Supp. 2d at
104 (“[M]y research discloses no case (in New York or other jurisdictions) in which a
court has found a de facto merger without at least some degree of ownership continuity—
except in the area of products liability (and the other tort areas mentioned ... below) where
some courts have justified new or expanded exceptions on special policy grounds.”); see
also Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, 294 F.3d 640, 650 (5th Cir. 2002) (“In other
words, a ‘mere continuation of business’ will be found where the purchasing corporation is
merely a ‘new hat’ for the seller with the same or similar management and ownership.”);
Weaver v. Nash Int’l, Inc., 730 F.2d 547, 548 (8th Cir. 1984) (declining to find successor
liability without unity of ownership).
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B. The Substantial Continuity Exception
In addition to the four traditional exceptions, however, some courts have
recognized other exceptions to the general rule of successor nonliability.
In particular, a few courts have recognized a “substantial continuity” exception, sometimes referred to as the “continuity of enterprise” exception. The
exception is often traced to Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., a Michigan
products liability case.97 In Turner, the Michigan Supreme Court jettisoned
the traditional requirement of continuity of ownership from the mere continuation exception, and held that the elements were simply:
(1) [B]asic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, including, apparently, a retention of key personnel, assets, general business
operations, and even the [seller’s] name.
(2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated, and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration received
from the buying corporation.
(3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary or the continuation of the normal
business operations of the seller corporation.
(4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller corporation.98

Thus, in contrast to the mere continuation and de facto merger exceptions,
“commonality of ownership is not required.”99 “[W]hereas the mere continuation test asks whether there is a continuation of the corporate entity of the
seller, the continuity of enterprise test sets a lower standard ... by focusing on
whether there was a continuation of the seller’s business operations.”100
Perhaps cognizant of the criticism that the expansive exception would
likely receive, the Turner court took pains to limit its decision to the products liability context. 101 And, upon revisiting the substantial continuity
97

244 N.W.2d 873, 881–82 (Mich. 1976).
Id. at 883–84 (emphasis added).
99
Einhorn v. ML Ruberton Const. Co., 632 F. 3d 89, 99 (3d Cir. 2011).
100
Matheson, supra note 83, at 396.
101
Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 877–78, 884 (“This is a products liability case first and
foremost .... [The general rule of nonliability] developed not in response to products liability problems .... The above-listed evidence makes out a prima facie case of continuation of corporate responsibility for products liability.”). For criticism of the substantial
continuity test, see, e.g., Reilly, supra note 86, at 789 (“Courts who have imposed successor liability under one of the continuity-based theories described above have not satisfactorily explained why, in a particular case, the interest of the plaintiff creditor should
prevail over that of the transferee.”); FLETCHER, supra note 82, at § 7123.06; see also
Glentel, Inc. v. Wireless Ventures, LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1003 (N.D. Ind. 2005);
Gallenberg Equip., Inc. v. Agromac Int’l, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1055 (E.D. Wis. 1998).
98
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exception for the first time in more than two decades, the Michigan Supreme
Court limited its holding again, concluding that when the “predecessor [is]
available for recourse ... the continuity of enterprise theory of successor
liability is inapplicable.”102 Subsequent formulations by federal courts have
added an additional requirement: that the acquirer knows of the liability
prior to the acquisition.103
Even with these limitations, however, the exception has not gained widespread acceptance at the state level.104 Additionally, even those courts that
have adopted the substantial continuity exception have recognized that its primary policy rationale is to facilitate compensation for innocent victims—a remedial purpose not present in the punitive context of FCPA enforcement.105
102

Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 597 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Mich. 1999).
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fisher v. Network Software Assocs., Inc., 180 F.
Supp. 2d 192, 195 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 747–48
(7th Cir. 1994), for the proposition that there are two prongs to successor liability under
the substantial continuity exception: “The first is that the successor had notice of the claim
before the acquisition.... The second condition is that there be substantial continuity in the
operation of the business before and after the sale ....”). Like Michigan, some circuits also
require that the seller be unable to provide adequate relief. See, e.g., Einhorn, 632 F. 3d at
95. As noted infra, the federal substantial continuity exception may not have the same
origins as the state law exception of the same name, although that has not stopped some
federal courts from citing Turner’s formulation of the exception. See infra note 169.
104
See Lea J. Heffernan, Application of the Remedial Purpose Canon to CERCLA
Successor Liability Issues after United States v. Bestfoods: Why State Corporate Law
Should Be Applied in Circuits Encompassing Substantial Continuity Exception States, 30
N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 387, 401 (2010) (“Five of the fifty states have expanded the traditional ‘mere continuation’ exception in order to focus on continuity of business or enterprise, rather than continuity of the predecessor corporation”); see, e.g., Tabor v. Metal
Ware Corp., 168 P.3d 814, 817 (Utah 2007) (“We decline to adopt ... the continuity of
enterprise exception because we believe that the four exceptions to the traditional rule
provide adequate protection to consumers. We note that if the legislature believes the existing exceptions inadequately protect consumers, it may wish to create additional statutory protections.”); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515, 519 (S.D.
1986) (“[W]e are not persuaded to follow Turner in this case where none of the owners,
officers or stockholders were the same ....”); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d
820, 829 (Wis. 1985) (“We decline to adopt the ‘expanded continuation’ exception to
nonliability ....”). Delaware, often considered to be at the vanguard of corporate law, has
not recognized the substantial continuity exception. See Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc.,
698 F. Supp. 535, 540–42 (D. Del. 1988) (noting that Delaware recognizes the four traditional exceptions and that, for mere continuation, it requires continuity of the same corporate entity); Stayton v. Clariant Corp., No. K05C-05-042, 2013 Del. Super. LEXIS 466,
at *13 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2013) (stating that Delaware recognizes the four traditional exceptions to successor nonliability).
105
See Foster, 597 N.W.2d at 511 (“The underlying rationale for the Turner Court’s
decision to disregard traditional corporate law principles was to provide a source of recovery for injured plaintiffs.”).
103
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Notwithstanding the fact that very few states have adopted the substantial continuity exception—and that even Michigan has limited it to cases involving products liability and employment discrimination106—federal courts
have adopted the substantial continuity exception in other discrete federal law
contexts. Courts have frequently discussed the exception in federal labor
and employment disputes and suits arising under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),107 though
the vitality of its application to CERCLA suits is doubtful.108 No court has
considered whether it applies to actions under the FCPA, however.109
III. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND CIVIL SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY UNDER THE FCPA
The text of the FCPA does not specifically provide for successor liability.110 Therefore, either successor liability is unavailable because Congress
did not provide for it in the statute, or some variety of common law addresses
the congressional omission. The introduction to any discussion of federal
common law is obliged to invoke Justice Brandeis’s famous statement in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: “There is no federal general common law.”111 If
106

See C.T. Charlton & Assocs. v. Thule, Inc., No. 12-2619, 541 Fed. App’x 549, 552
(6th Cir. 2013).
107
See Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 764 (7th Cir.
2013) (“[W]hen liability is based on a violation of a federal statute relating to labor relations or employment, a federal common law standard of successor liability is applied that
is more favorable to plaintiffs than most state-law standards to which the court might
otherwise look.”); New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indust., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting circuit split on successor liability test for CERCLA).
108
See generally infra Part III; see, e.g., Nat’l Serv. Indust., Inc., 460 F.3d at 215
(abandoning its precedent which had applied substantial continuity exception to CERCLA
claims).
109
Grimm, supra note 28, at 281.
110
Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452–53 (2002) (“Where Congress
wanted to provide for successor liability in the Coal Act, it did so explicitly, as demonstrated
by other sections in the Act that give the option of attaching liability to ‘successors’ and
‘successors in interest.’”).
111
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Authors have noted that there is no good definition of federal
common law. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common
Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 589 (2006) (“The Supreme Court has been unsuccessful in
offering either an inclusive definition or a theory of federal common law. Indeed it has
never really tried.”). For the purposes of this Article, I use “federal common law” as the
Court used it in the Atherton v. FDIC: “a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an
interpretation of a federal statute or a properly promulgated administrative rule, but rather
to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal rule of decision.” 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997)
(citation omitted).
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that maxim held true in every case, the omission of successor liability from
the text of the FCPA would be dispositive of the issue.112
A well-known line of post-Erie cases, usually traced to Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States,113 has demonstrated that federal courts can, and do,
develop federal common law in certain circumstances. There are two stages
to determining whether and how federal courts should apply federal common law.114 First, does the court have the authority to create federal common law?115 Second, assuming the court has the authority to create federal
common law, how should it exercise its discretion to do so?116
A. Do Federal Courts Have the Authority to Create a Common Law of
Successor Liability Under the FCPA?
Federal courts may fashion rules of decision when they are granted
express or implied authority to do so by the Constitution, treaties, or Congress, 117 or when the cases fall within narrow enclaves defined by the
Supreme Court.118
112

Arguably, when a law makes no mention of successor liability, common law is necessary to fill not one, but two separate gaps. For statutes that include a reference to “successors”
as potentially liable parties, common law may be necessary to give content to the term.
See, e.g., Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted) (“Under [the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)], ‘employer’ is defined to include a ‘successor in interest’
to a plaintiff’s previous employer .... USERRA does not, however, define ‘successor in
interest.’”); Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 780 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
that the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) imposes liability on “successors in interest,” but “[t]he FMLA does not define the term ‘successor in interest.’”). This may be
closer to traditional statutory interpretation than true federal common law, however.
For laws that do not even include a reference to “successors,” resorting to common law
is necessary not merely to give content to a statutory term, but also to provide the entire
theory of liability. For example, CERCLA imposes liability only on “persons,” a term
which is defined to include corporations, but which does not explicitly include corporate
successors. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)–(21) (2012). Nonetheless, as discussed in more detail
later, the circuits have applied federal common law to provide the theory of successor liability in CERCLA cases (although they have disagreed at times on the test for successor
liability). See infra notes 152–54. Accordingly, this Article assumes that a court could
apply common law not only to define the contours of successor liability under the FCPA,
but also to provide the theory of liability itself, notwithstanding the fact that the FCPA
does not explicitly include “successors” in its text.
113
318 U.S. 363 (1943).
114
See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 111, at 647.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Accord Texas Indust., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642–43 (1981);
see, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012); Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450–51 (1957).
118
See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 111, at 593.
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The FCPA contains no express grant of authority to develop federal
common law, and the mere “vesting of jurisdiction ... does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal common law ... nor does the
existence of congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal courts
are free to develop a common law to govern those areas until Congress
acts.”119 Authority to develop a federal common law of successor liability
also is not impliedly granted because there is no support in the legislative
history for such a grant.120
In addition to constitutional and congressional grants of authority, the
Supreme Court has recognized “enclaves” of federal common law in which
the federal courts may establish a federal rule of decision.121 Although these
enclaves are “few and restricted,”122 they include cases involving “the rights
and obligations of the United States,”123 government contractor liability,124
“interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of
States or our relations with foreign nations,”125 admiralty,126 and claim
119

Texas Indust., Inc., 451 U.S. at 640–41 (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)).
120
Congress and the President intended the 1998 amendments to the FCPA to bring
the United States into compliance with its treaty obligations under the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the “OECD Convention”). See
Comm. on Commerce, International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, H.R.
Rep. No. 105-802, at 9 (1998); Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, International
Ant-Bribery Act of 1998, S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 1 (1998); William J. Clinton, Statement
on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 34 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998). The OECD Convention required its signatories
to enact laws prohibiting bribery of foreign government officials. See Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions pmbl., Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1, 4. Notably, however, the OECD Convention was silent on
successor liability. See generally id. Accordingly, even assuming the reference to the
OECD Convention in the legislative history of the 1998 amendments could be sufficient
to allow a court to rely upon international law, it provides no illumination as to issues of
successor liability.
121
Some authors have expressed doubt about whether the “enclave” theory of federal
common law is still viable. See, e.g., Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 111, at 614. Reconciling the theories of courts’ federal common law power is well beyond the scope of this Article.
122
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
123
Texas Indust., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641 (1981) (citing United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943)).
124
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 500 (1987).
125
Texas Indust., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641 (citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)).
126
Texas Indust., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641 (citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979); Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963)).
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preclusion for federal judgments in diversity cases.127 Cases brought under
the FCPA arguably fit within either the enclave for suits involving “the
rights and obligations of the United States” or the enclave for disputes
implicating “our relations with foreign nations.”128
B. What is the Content of the Federal Common Law?
Assuming that a court has the power to fashion federal common law,
there is still a question as to how the court should decide the content of that
common law. As the Supreme Court has stated, “the existence of related
federal statutes does not automatically show that Congress intended courts
to dictate the content of federal common law rules, for ‘Congress acts ...
against the background of the total corpus juris of the states ...’.”129 Potential sources for the content of the federal common law include: (1) the law
of a particular state; (2) the law of the majority of states; or (3) analogy to
similar federal common law decisions.130
1. Kimbell Foods and Subsequent Supreme Court Cases
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., the Supreme Court established
a three-part test to determine when federal common law should displace
state law: “(1) whether the federal program, by its very nature, required
uniformity; (2) whether application of state law would frustrate specific
objectives of the federal program; and (3) whether application of uniform
federal law would disrupt existing commercial relations predicated on
state law.”131 Applying this test, the Kimbell Foods court concluded that it
should incorporate state law to decide whether contractual liens arising
127

Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001).
See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST.
L.J. 929, 938 (2012) (tracing legislative history and stating, “[F]oreign policy was the
primary policy concern from the discovered foreign corporate payments which motivated
Congress to act. However, foreign policy was not the sole reason motivating Congress.
The legislative record also evidences that congressional motivation was sparked by a postWatergate morality, economic perceptions, and global leadership.”). For the purposes of the
Article, I assume that courts have the authority to develop a federal common law of successor liability under the FCPA.
129
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
130
See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of the General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
503, 533–34 (2006). There is a circuit split concerning CERCLA successor liability discussed later. See Griffith & Goutman, infra note 151.
131
United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979)).
128
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from federal loan programs took precedence over private liens.132 A string
of Supreme Court opinions in the 1990s elaborated on the Kimbell Foods
test and strongly indicated that lower courts should be wary of displacing
state law.
In Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held
that in a derivative action under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
law governing any demand futility exception should be drawn from the law
of the state of incorporation.133 After quickly concluding that federal common law applied, the Court stated:
It does not follow, however, that the content of such a rule must be
wholly the product of a federal court’s own devising. Our cases indicate
that a court should endeavor to fill the interstices of federal remedial
schemes with uniform federal rules only when the scheme in question
evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards ... or when express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional
policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand ....134

The Court also emphasized that “[t]he presumption that state law should be
incorporated into federal common law is particularly strong in areas in which
private parties have entered legal relationships with the expectation that
their rights and obligations would be governed by state-law standards ....
Corporation law is one such area.”135
Three years later, in O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, the Court emphasized that the second Kimbell Foods factor—conflict between state and
federal law—was a necessary condition for the application of federal common law.136 Indeed, the Court stated, “[o]ur cases uniformly require the existence of such a conflict as a precondition for recognition of a federal rule
of decision.”137 The O’Melveny court also gave short shrift to uniformity
concerns, calling them the “most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged
federal interests.”138
In Atherton v. FDIC, the Court reinforced its statement in O’Melveny
that conflict is a “precondition” to federal law supplanting that of the
states.139 Reading Atherton and O’Melveny together, the absence of a bona
132

Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 740.
500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991).
134
Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
366–67; Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988); DelCostello v.
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169–72 (1983)).
135
Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98 (citations omitted).
136
512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994).
137
Id. at 87 (citation omitted).
138
Id. at 88.
139
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (citations omitted).
133
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fide conflict between the state and federal jurisprudence means that a federal court should not apply federal common law merely because application of state law risks inconsistent judgments.140 The Atherton court again
derided “generalized pleas for uniformity,”141 stating that “[t]o invoke the
concept of uniformity ... is not to prove its need.”142
Finally, in 1998, the Court indicated that it would take a dim view of the
creation of a federal common law of corporate liability.143 Specifically, in
United States v. Bestfoods, the Court considered a parent company’s liability
under CERCLA for its subsidiary’s operations.144 In addition to analyzing
direct liability, the Court decided whether the parent could be held responsible on the basis of the subsidiary’s conduct.145 Despite scholarly criticism
of parent nonliability, the Bestfoods court wrote that “nothing in CERCLA
purports to reject this bedrock principle, and against this venerable commonlaw backdrop, the congressional silence is audible.”146 Importantly, the
Court stated:
CERCLA is thus like many another congressional enactment in giving
no indication that “the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon a federal
statute,” ... and the failure of the statute to speak to a matter as fundamental
as the liability implications of corporate ownership demands application
of the rule that “[i]n order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law.”147

The Court also recognized the disagreement over whether courts should
borrow state law or instead create a federal common law of veil piercing, but
it did not address the divergence because no party had raised the issue.148
140

Interestingly, the O’Melveny Court also wrote that “California law, not federal law,
governs the imputation of knowledge to corporate victims of alleged negligence, and that is
so whether or not California chooses to follow the majority rule.” O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at
84–85. The application of respondeat superior as a basis for corporate liability is one of the
issues frequently cited by FCPA reformers. See, e.g., Mukasey Testimony, supra note 45, at
19 (“A company can ... be held liable for violations committed by rogue employees, agents
or subsidiaries even if the company has a state-of-the-art FCPA compliance program.”).
An analysis of the choice of law for that issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but
O’Melveny certainly points in the direction of state law.
141
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979).
142
Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
143
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 55.
146
Id. at 62 (citation omitted).
147
Id. at 63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 478 (1979) and United States v.
Texas, 507 U. S. 529, 534 (1993), respectively).
148
Id. at 63 n.9. Veil-piercing doctrines often are relevant in corporate FCPA enforcement actions as well, but discussion of those doctrines is beyond the scope of this Article.
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2. The Circuits’ Analyses of Successor Liability Under
Federal Statutes
In the aftermath of Kimbell Foods, the circuit courts have grappled
with the federal common law of successor liability in matters as diverse as
CERCLA, federal labor and employment laws, and the enforcement of
patent infringement judgments.149 Although any analysis of civil successor
liability under the FCPA requires an independent application of the Kimbell
Foods test, the circuits’ analyses of successor liability in these other contexts is instructive.
a. CERCLA
CERCLA is “not a model of legislative draftsmanship,” yet it carries
the potential for enormous liability.150 Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that
litigants, courts, and commentators have fiercely debated the relevant law
for successor liability in the context of CERCLA.151 Litigation over the
federal common law of successor liability—and whether it includes the
substantial continuity exception—led to a circuit split and significant
scholarly commentary.152
Prior to Bestfoods, “the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals held, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals assumed, and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that federal courts should develop a
uniform federal common law of successor liability for CERCLA.”153 In
149

Although it is not a circuit opinion, it is worth noting that the Western District of
Washington recently recognized that the Kimbell Foods analysis is necessary to determine
successor liability under the federal False Claims Act (FCA). See United States ex rel.
Klein v. Omeros Corp., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (citations omitted)
(incorporating state law and rejecting substantial continuity exception because “[plaintiff]
makes no argument for why the four traditional [state-law] exceptions do not adequately
protect the FCA’s goal of preventing fraud on the government, beyond generically asserting
that ‘the FCA is designed to serve a broad, remedial interest in preventing fraud against
the federal government’”).
150
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986).
151
See Rodney B. Griffith & Thomas M. Goutman, A Hiccup in Federal Common Law
Jurisprudence: Bestfoods and the Supreme Court’s Restraints on Development of Federal
Rules of Corporate Liability, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 359, 394–95 (2006); Rosenberg,
supra note 82; Matt Sieving, Rising Phoenix-like from the Ashes: An Argument for Expanded
Corporate Successor Liability under CERCLA, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 427 (2008); Michael
Carter, Comment, Successor Liability Under CERCLA: It’s Time to Fully Embrace State
Law, 156 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 767 (2008).
152
See Griffith & Goutman, supra note 151, at 394–95.
153
Id. (citing B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 581–619 (2d Cir. 1996), overruled by New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2003); United States
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contrast, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits adopted state law to provide the
framework for analyzing asset purchasers’ CERCLA liability.154
Beginning in 1998, however, some courts reconsidered the creation and
content of a federal common law of CERCLA successor liability.155 For
example, the First Circuit, which addressed the issue for the first time only
after Bestfoods, concluded that the state law of successor liability applied.156
Furthermore, in United States v. General Battery Corp., the Third Circuit
held that although federal common law still applied to successor liability
under CERCLA after Bestfoods, the content of the common law was “‘the
general doctrine of successor liability in operation in most states.’”157 Thus,
because the general doctrine of successor liability in most states does not
include the substantial continuity exception, the Third Circuit declined an invitation to adopt it.158 Relatedly, in New York v. National Services Industries
Inc., the Second Circuit overruled its pre-Bestfoods decision applying the
substantial continuity exception, because the exception is not part of the general federal common law.159 In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., the Ninth Circuit also overruled its pre-Bestfoods
decision applying the substantial continuity exception to CERCLA claims,
because the substantial continuity exception is not the traditional rule in
most states.160 Even the Eighth Circuit has acknowledged that the exception was cast in doubt by Bestfoods.161
v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837–38 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 486–87 (8th Cir. 1992); Louisiana-Pacific Corp.
v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1262–64 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled by Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1997); Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90–92 (3rd Cir. 1988)). In North Shore
Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., the Seventh Circuit applied federal common law based upon the
parties’ mutual use of it in their briefs, but it specifically reserved judgment as to the issue.
152 F.3d 642, 650–51 (7th Cir. 1998).
154
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501–02 (11th Cir.
1996) (applying state law to question of successor liability for a limited liability partnership);
City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251–52 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying
Michigan law and distinguishing Turner as limited to products liability cases).
155
See United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
156
Davis, 261 F.3d at 53–54.
157
423 F.3d at 298 (citing Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989)).
158
Id. at 309.
159
352 F.3d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 2003). Later in the same dispute, then-Judge
Sotomayor suggested even more strongly that Kimbell Foods required incorporation of the
state law of successor liability. See New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 460 F.3d 201, 208–09 (2d
Cir. 2006).
160
159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1998).
161
K.C.1986 Ltd. P’ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 F.3d 1009, 1022 (8th Cir. 2007). The
Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary to overrule its prior precedent in light of Bestfoods
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Although these post-Bestfoods opinions used different reasoning, virtually all of them led to the same result—the substantial continuity exception is inapplicable to CERCLA successor liability. Although observers
have critiqued the variety of the circuits’ reasoning, they generally have
agreed with the result.162
b. Federal Labor and Employment Laws
In several pre-Kimbell Foods cases, the Supreme Court adopted the
substantial continuity exception (or an exception very similar to it) for
successor liability under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act and the National Labor Relations Act. 163 In so doing, the Supreme
Court emphasized the potential for conflict with the express statutory purpose of labor peace if expansive successor liability was not applicable.164
Circuit courts have adopted this reasoning to apply the substantial continuity exception to other federal labor and employment statutes including
Title VII,165 ERISA,166 the Railway Labor Act,167 the Age Discrimination
because even assuming the substantial continuity exception was still viable, the plaintiff
in K.C. 1986 could not establish successor liability. Id. at 1024–25. The Fourth Circuit
has not directly addressed the substantial continuity exception in a CERCLA case after
Bestfoods, though it has given the faintest indication that the exception may no longer be
good law. See PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 173 (4th
Cir. 2013). Under CERCLA, successor corporations may be liable for the actions of their
predecessors. However, as at common law, a corporation that acquires the assets of another
corporation typically does not acquire its liabilities, unless: “(1) the successor expressly
or impliedly agrees to assume the liabilities of the predecessor; (2) the transaction may be
considered a de facto merger; (3) the successor may be considered a ‘mere continuation’
of the predecessor; or (4) the transaction is fraudulent .... In the past, we have also recognized successor liability where ‘substantial continuity’ exists between a predecessor and
successor corporation.” Id. (citations omitted).
162
See Rosenberg, supra note 82, at 455–56 (“CERCLA’s silence regarding asset
purchaser liability … should receive similar treatment to that given parent corporations in
Bestfoods—Congress’ silence should be dispositive and federal courts should defer to
state corporation law rules.” (citation omitted)); Carter, supra note 151. But see Sieving,
supra note 151.
163
See Howard Johnson Co., v. Hotel Emps., 417 U.S. 249, 259–64 (1974); Golden
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184–85 (1973).
164
See Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 259–64; Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S.
at 184–85.
165
EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090–91 (6th Cir.
1974).
166
Einhorn v. ML Ruberton Const. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 96–100 (3d Cir. 2011);
Upholsterers’ Int’l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture, 920 F.2d 1323, 1327–28
(7th Cir. 1990).
167
Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 210 F.3d 18, 26 (1st
Cir. 2000).
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in Employment Act,168 the Family and Medical Leave Act,169 and the Fair
Labor Standards Act.170
In one of the most recent of these cases, Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power
Solutions, L.L.C., Judge Posner went so far as to say that “successor liability is appropriate in suits to enforce federal labor or employment laws—
even when the successor disclaimed liability when it acquired the assets in
question—unless there are good reasons to withhold such liability.” 171
Arguably, this is an even stronger formulation of the federal law of successor liability than the “traditional” substantial continuity exception.172
One page later, however, Judge Posner cast doubt on the entire enterprise
of federal common law successor liability:
There are better arguments against having a federal standard for labor
and employment cases, besides the general objections to multifactor
tests that we noted earlier: applying a judge-made standard amounts to
judicial amendment of the statutes to which it’s applied by adding a remedy that Congress has not authorized; implied remedies (that is, remedies added by judges to the remedies specified in statutes) have become
disfavored; and borrowing state common law, especially a common law
principle uniform across the states, to fill gaps in federal statutes is an
attractive alternative to creating federal common law, an alternative the
Supreme Court adopted for example in United States v. Bestfoods ... in
regard to the liability of a corporation under the Superfund law for a
subsidiary’s violations.173

Unfortunately, the defendant in Teed failed to raise these “better arguments,” and therefore the opinion did not further explore them.174 Given
Judge Posner’s strong suggestion that such arguments may be successful,
however, it is likely that subsequent labor and employment defendants will
raise these arguments. As with CERCLA, courts may follow the suggestion in Bestfoods and reject the use of common law to create successor
168

EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 747–48 (7th Cir. 1994). In G-K-G, the
Seventh Circuit hinted that application of federal common law might not be appropriate,
but applied it anyway because the “defendants d[id] not challenge that application.” Id. at
748 (“The reason for this special federal common law doctrine of successor liability—
this departure from the more limited approach of the common law generally—is a little
elusive, especially in a case such as this in which the actual violator is fully answerable
for the consequences of the violation.”). Id. at 748.
169
Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 781 (9th Cir. 2010).
170
Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., 711 F.3d 763, 766–68 (7th Cir.
2013).
171
Id. at 766.
172
Note, however, the many potentially “good reasons to withhold such liability” cited
in Teed. Id. at 766.
173
Id. at 767 (citation omitted).
174
Id.
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liability for violations of federal labor and employment laws (or, at a minimum, the circuits may incorporate the state law of successor liability to fill
the content of federal common law).
Alternatively, two circuits have considered successor liability in labor and
employment cases to be sui generis such that application of state corporation law would always be inappropriate.175 In Cobb v. Contract Transport,
Inc.,176 the Sixth Circuit held that “[s]uccessor liability under the [Family
and Medical Leave Act] ... derives from labor law, not corporate law ....
Labor cases, whose holdings were later applied to Title VII cases, apply an
equitable, policy driven approach to successor liability that has very little
connection to the concept of successor liability in corporate law.”177 The
Ninth Circuit followed Cobb: “The inquiry is not merely whether the new
employer is a ‘successor’ in the strict corporate-law sense of the term. The
successorship inquiry in the labor-law context is much broader.”178
Even in this view of the doctrine, however, successor liability in labor
and employment cases is cabined by the peculiar policies underlying the
field.179 Thus, this conception of successor liability in labor and employment cases is not analogous to the other formulations of successor liability
discussed in this Article—including successor liability under the FCPA.
c. Enforcement of Patent Judgments
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to have analyzed successor liability in the context of the federal patent regime.180 In Mickwoski v. Visi-Trak
Worldwide, LLC, 181 the plaintiff obtained a multi-million dollar patent
infringement judgment against Visi-Trak Corporation (VTC). Visi-Trak
175

See Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2010); Cobb v.
Contract Transport, Inc., 452 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2006).
176
452 F.3d at 551.
177
Id.
178
Sullivan, 623 F.3d at 781.
179
See New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d 682, 686 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Within federal law, the substantial continuity doctrine is well established in the area of labor law ....
However, the labor law cases are particular to the labor law context and therefore have not
been and cannot easily be extended to other areas of federal common law.” (citation omitted)).
The unique origin of the substantial continuity exception in federal labor law has not prevented some courts from blurring its distinction from the state law substantial continuity
exception. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A]n approach
quite similar to that used in Turner [v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 24 N.W.2d 873, 883
(Mich. 1976)] is the one we follow in determining successor liability” under CERCLA).
180
See Mickowski v. Visi-Track Worldwide, LLC, 415 F.3d 501, 509, 511 (6th Cir.
2005).
181
Id. at 516.
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Worldwide, LLC (Visi-Trak Worldwide) subsequently bought substantially
all of VTC’s assets, and the plaintiff brought suit to enforce his patent judgment against Visi-Trak Worldwide pursuant to the substantial continuity exception to successor liability.182 Visi-Trak Worldwide wisely advanced two
arguments against liability: (1) the “substantial continuity” exception was not
part of the federal common law; and (2) in any event, Ohio law, not federal
common law, applied to the enforcement of patent judgments and Ohio only
recognized the traditional four exceptions to successor nonliability.183
The Sixth Circuit agreed with both of these arguments. After reviewing
Atherton, the Sixth Circuit effectively held that the plaintiff could not establish conflict, the sine qua non of the Kimbell Foods test: “the mere fact
that the ‘substantial continuity’ test of federal common law is more encompassing than the ‘mere continuation’ test of state common law does not
demonstrate a ‘significant conflict between some federal policy or interest
and the use of state law.’”184 The Sixth Circuit’s opinion also cabined the
substantial continuity exception to labor and employment law:
Because federal patent laws do not speak to the issue of successor liability, there is little basis to abrogate the general rule derived from state
common law that substantial continuity is insufficient to impose liability.
The substantial continuity test has gained widespread acceptance only
in the narrow areas of labor law, employment discrimination law, and
pension benefit litigation.185

3. The Application of Kimbell Foods to Successor Liability
Under the FCPA
As described above, federal courts have become increasingly skeptical
about creating a federal rule of successor liability where a statute is silent.
Scholars are mostly in accord with the courts.186 With these decisions and
views in mind, the next step is to apply the three Kimbell Foods factors to
182

Id.
Id. at 509–10.
184
Id. at 511–12 (quoting Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 519 U.S. 213
(1997)).
185
Id. at 515; see also Storage & Office Sys., LLC v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 2d
955, 963 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (stating that “[t]he government’s theory of successor liability is
grounded in labor law decisions and appears to have little or no application outside of the
employment context.”).
186
See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 130, at 558 (“Under the approach taken by most states,
an entity that buys a corporation’s assets in good faith will be liable either for all of the
corporation’s debts or for none of them. If a federal statute says nothing about successor
liability, courts should hesitate before inferring that it departs from this general principle.”)
(footnotes omitted).
183
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common law successor liability under the FCPA: “(1) whether the [FCPA],
by its very nature, required uniformity; (2) whether application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the [FCPA]; and (3) whether application of uniform federal law would disrupt existing commercial relations
predicated on state law.”187
a. Uniformity
Concerns about uniformity essentially ask the court to consider the potential benefits of a uniform law. In the case of successor liability, a uniform
law would benefit buyers and sellers of assets. Asset purchasers and sellers
would know which test for successor liability applied to their transactions
and could appropriately allocate risks (or simply forgo transactions). 188
The relevant inquiry under Kimbell Foods, however, is whether the federal
program requires uniformity, not whether uniformity would have some benefits to private actors.189 Additionally, simply easing federal enforcers’ litigation costs and research is insufficient to establish a need for uniformity.190
Furthermore, the adoption of a universal rule may not meaningfully enhance certainty at all. In Kamen, the Supreme Court rejected a universal demand rule for derivative suits in part because such a rule would necessitate
judicial review “somewhere down the road,” before the board of directors
could appreciate the true effect of a demand.191 Similarly, in the successor
liability context, imposition of the “substantial continuity” exception may
decrease certainty.192 Under the traditional exceptions to successor liability,
187

United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F. 3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728–29 (1979)).
188
But see New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 2003) (Leval,
J., concurring) (“It would be quite mistaken to view these instances as involving the use of
a pre-existing [substantial continuity] test of clear, well-understood contours, which courts
have plugged into first one, then another statutory scheme. To the contrary, in the case of
each statutory scheme, the courts, perceiving the inadequacy of the common law rules to
support the objectives of the particular statute, have groped case by case toward a new standard, sometimes following the lead of the administrative agency charged with front-line
administration of the statute.”).
189
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728–29.
190
See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994) (“Uniformity of law
might facilitate the FDIC’s nationwide litigation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state
research and reducing uncertainty—but if the avoidance of [these] ordinary consequences
qualified as an identifiable federal interest, we would be awash in ‘federal common-law’
rules.”); see also Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501 (11th Cir.
1996) (“Adopting a uniform rule would, perhaps, expedite enforcement of CERCLA by
decreasing uncertainty in assessing liability under the statute. But this argument could be
made for adopting a uniform rule in the context of just about any federal statute.”).
191
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 105 (1991).
192
Redwing, 94 F.3d at 1501.
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a bona fide, arm’s-length purchaser can be relatively certain that it will not be
held to have assumed FCPA liability merely by acquiring assets.193 Under
the “substantial continuity” exception, however, the acquirer would need to
hold its breath for judicial review of whether, within the definition of the
FCPA, it “knew” of the liability prior to the purchase.194
Finally, it is not clear that the uniformity of state laws is even the appropriate question. The Second Circuit has stated that “variations in rules among
states do not prove a need for uniformity ‘as long as the applicable standard
is applied evenhandedly to particular disputes.’”195
In sum, the uniformity factor does not weigh in favor of a purely federal
rule of FCPA successor liability.196 Even if it did, it would carry little weight,
as uniformity is “the most generic (and lightly invoked)” of the Kimbell
Foods prongs.197
b. Frustration of Federal Law
As an initial matter, the mere fact that the FCPA is a federal statute
does not mean that a federal rule of decision should apply to issues of
193

Grimm, supra note 28, at 283–84.
Consider, in particular, the situation of a purchaser which conducts extensive due
diligence, but does not uncover the liability until after closing. Because knowledge can be
inferred from circumstances, the government may argue that the diligence is evidence of
knowledge. See id. at 290 (“[M]erely being a ‘substantial continuation’ can lead to an inference of the acquirer’s knowledge of the seller’s wrongdoing, such that liability moves with
the assets, even if actual knowledge is absent .... The danger is heightened in cases where
even the most thorough due diligence may not reveal wrongdoing cloaked in secrecy—
such as violations of the export control laws or the FCPA.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Upholsters’ Int’l Union Pension Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323,
1329–30 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the substantial continuity exception and reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant in part because seller’s employee with knowledge of
liability “had at least one meeting and a number of phone conversations with [buyer’s]
officials before the acquisition took place, and that ‘questions about the company’ were
discussed”). This is particularly problematic in the FCPA context, where there is a broad
statutory definition of knowledge. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(2)(B), 78dd-2(h)(3)(B)
(2012) (“When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstances
does not exist.”).
195
Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 182–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673 (1979)).
196
In an oft-cited CERCLA case involving successor liability, the United States acknowledged in an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit that, “the law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor liability is largely uniform.” Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994).
194
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successor liability: “The existence of a complex federal statutory scheme
does not automatically show that Congress intended to fill its gaps with
rules of federal common law.”198 Instead, for a federal law of successor
liability to apply, the incorporation of state law must frustrate the purpose
of the FCPA.199
One argument is that a muscular view of successor liability encourages
would-be acquirers to voluntarily disclose more FCPA violations to the government. For example, in Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global Momentum
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Professors Kennedy and Danielsen
endorse an Opinion Procedure release in which an acquirer agreed to selfreport pre-acquisition FCPA violations that it discovered after the transaction closed.200 The DOJ and SEC also touted this Opinion Procedure release
in the Resource Guide.201 This paradigm effectively conscripts acquirers to
root out and disclose FCPA violations of potential targets.202 In light of the
pressure to voluntarily report pre-acquisition violations, an expansive doctrine of successor liability might result in more violations being brought to
the attention of the government.
Showing that expansive successor liability arguably could further congressional intent is not the same thing as showing that state law conflicts
with a specific federal objective, however.203 As one commentator has said
198

Marsh, 499 F.3d at 178–81 (applying state common law of veil-piercing to
CERCLA litigation).
199
Cf. Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11th Cir. 1996)
(“CERCLA, however, does not purport to be a source of partnership law. Thus, CERCLA
does not require that federal law displace state laws governing the liability of limited partners unless these laws permit action prohibited by the Act, or unless ‘their application
would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action.’”).
200
David Kennedy & Dan Danielsen, Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 55 (2011),
available at http://www.harvardiglp.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Foreign-Corrupt-Practices
-FINAL.pdf.
201
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 86–87; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE 08-02 (June 13, 2008), available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0802.pdf.
202
Grimm, supra note 28, at 325–28.
203
One of the classic cases on “conflict” is Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988). In Boyle, the plaintiff sought to impose state law “defective design” liability against
government contractors responsible for designing military equipment. An existing federal
law, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (2013), specified that the government could not be held liable for
discretionary functions (such as equipment design). Id. at 511. The Court held that permitting the plaintiff’s claim would frustrate § 1346, because permitting design liability against
government contractors would “directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will
raise its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly affected.” Id.
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in the CERCLA context, the purported conflict “can only be about the desire to apply the broader substantial continuity standard to reach more corporate successors than can be held liable under state law as it stands. The
motivation is therefore a concern of inadequacy, not conflict.”204
Mere inadequacy is insufficient to find conflict in the FCPA context as
well. For example, a judicially created private right of action might also
result in more FCPA violations being brought to the attention of the DOJ
and SEC, but the Sixth Circuit has rejected an implied private right of
action under the FCPA and the government does not contend otherwise.205
Similarly, the fact that the government might uncover more FCPA violations if federal courts adopt the substantial continuity exception is no reason to find “conflict” between the FCPA and the traditional exceptions of
state law. As the Sixth Circuit stated in Mickowksi, the mere fact that a
plaintiff can bring more suits under the substantial continuity exception than
the traditional state rule is insufficient to show a conflict between state and
federal policy.206
Next, analyses of the “conflict” factor sometimes discuss the threat of
a “race to the bottom” amongst the states if state law is applied.207 In other
words, incorporating state law theoretically could prompt corporations to
flee to the states that have only the traditional exceptions, in an effort to
limit their FCPA successor liability. Of course, as the Ninth Circuit has
stated regarding CERCLA successor liability, “[i]t is unrealistic to think
that a state would alter general corporate law principles to become a peculiarly hospitable haven for polluters.”208 It is equally unrealistic to think
that a state would alter its general corporate law principles to accommodate
at 507. Boyle represents a true conflict between state and federal law. In contrast, applying
the state law of successor liability does not directly affect the interests of the United States.
As described above, narrow exceptions may result in fewer cases being disclosed to the
government, but application of those exceptions does not prevent the DOJ or SEC from
pursuing the culpable parties (namely, the seller and its employees and agents).
204
Stephanie A. Rotter, Making it a Federal Issue, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 427, 458–
59 (2009).
205
See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028–29 (6th Cir. 1990); Resource
Guide, supra note 1, at 105 n.21 (“There is no private right of action under the FCPA.”).
206
See Mickowski v. Visi-Track Worldwide, LLC, 415 F.3d 501, 511–12 (6th Cir.
2005); see also Marsh v. Rosenbloom, 499 F.3d 165, 183 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n O’Melveny
the Supreme Court ‘rejected the view that the government is entitled to an expansive federal
common law standard just because the government would win more often’….” (quoting
Bradford C. Mank, Should State Corporate Law Define Successor Liability?: The Demise
of CERCLA’s Federal Common Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1157, 1159 (2000)).
207
See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Brown & Bryant, 159 F.3d 358,
363–64 (9th Cir. 1998).
208
Id. at 364.
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corrupt companies. Indeed, some states have enacted laws criminalizing
both public and private sector bribery—a step even more aggressive than
the FCPA’s prohibition against bribing foreign government officials. 209
Any company relocating to such a state to avoid corruption liability would
be unpleasantly surprised.
Finally, understanding successor liability in terms of the traditionally
narrow exceptions does not deter acquirers from conducting due diligence
nor from integrating acquired companies into the acquirers’ compliance
programs. Because of post-acquisition liability (not to mention the importance of appropriately valuing potential assets), buyers are incentivized to uncover any contracts, products, relationships, and lines of business that might
be predicated on bribery (and thus likely must be terminated).210 Similarly,
because buyers are liable for the post-acquisition violations of the acquired
business line, they are still incentivized to swiftly incorporate the targets into
the acquirers’ compliance programs.211 Accordingly, even in the absence of
an expanded notion of successor liability, acquirers have strong incentives
to continue engaging in due diligence and compliance measures.212
In fact, an aggressive doctrine of successor liability might contradict
congressional intent. In Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reviewed the legislative history of the FCPA and concluded that the existence
of the Opinion Procedure “clearly evinces a preference for compliance in lieu
of prosecution,” and “the introduction of private plaintiffs interested solely
in post-violation enforcement, rather than pre-violation compliance, most
assuredly would hinder congressional efforts to protect companies and their
employees concerned about FCPA liability.”213 With respect to successor
liability, a “white hat” company may be deterred from buying an FCPA
violator, stopping the corrupt conduct, and integrating the target into the
acquirer’s robust compliance program.214 Deterring such acquisitions with
the threat of indictment would conflict with the congressional preference
for “compliance in lieu of prosecution.”215
209

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 881 (West 2014); CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3
(West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.43 (West 2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 180.00,
180.03 (McKinney 2014).
210
See Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28 (“[D]ue diligence helps an acquiring company accurately value the target company.”).
211
Grimm, supra note 28, at 250–52.
212
Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying
Proposal for Imposing CERCLA Liability on Asset Purchasers, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 435, 454–
55 (1998).
213
915 F.2d 1024, 1029–30 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
214
See Grimm, supra note 28, at 298.
215
It is not only Congress that has stated a preference for compliance; DOJ officials
have acknowledged the same priority. See, e.g., Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole
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c. Disruption of Commercial Relationships
Companies intentionally select their states of incorporation to provide
greater certainty and predictability to their corporate law issues.216 Thus,
“[t]he displacement of state law is particularly disfavored in the area of
corporate law, because business decisions typically proceed in reliance on
the applicable state standards.”217 Indeed, Kimbell Foods recognized that,
“[i]n structuring financial transactions, businessmen depend on state commercial law to provide the stability essential for reliable evaluation of the
risks involved.”218
Similarly, in mergers and acquisitions, the parties justifiably assume that
traditional successor liability law will apply to transferred assets. Applying
piecemeal successor liability law—for example, state law for tort liability,
federal law for FCPA liabilities—would disrupt these assumptions.
Some may argue that the introduction of the substantial continuity
exception would result in the seller’s potential FCPA liability being priced
into the deal. The ultimate costs of FCPA resolutions are notoriously difficult to estimate ex ante, however. Commentators have described the trouble
that companies have in estimating their own liabilities when considering a
self-disclosure to the government. 219 In the merger and acquisition context, this uncertainty is exacerbated by the asymmetry in the parties’ information, leading to a potential windfall for the culpable seller.220 Leaving
FCPA liability with the selling company—and, of course, the individuals
responsible—allows for a more efficient and just allocation of risk.221
Speaks at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Nov. 19,
2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131119
.html (“We prefer prevention to prosecution and we want companies to successfully recognize and resist demands for bribes and to comply with the law.”).
216
See Cort v. Ash, 422 US 66, 84 (1975) (“Corporations are creatures of state law,
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except
where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”).
217
United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kamen
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 105, 111 (1991).
218
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739 (1979).
219
See Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA
Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 394–95, 406, 417,
425 (2011) (surveying negotiated FCPA resolutions from 2002–2009 and concluding,
“there is a great deal of variation in the amount of penalties that companies face when
they voluntarily disclose FCPA violations.”).
220
Grimm, supra note 28, at 296–99
221
See New York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d 682, 694 (2d Cir. 2003) (Leval, J.,
concurring) (“A rule of successor liability that threatened good-faith buyers with huge,
unpredictable liability would also impose serious systemic costs on the economy. Such a
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In principle, a buyer could insure itself against FCPA risk, or cause the
seller to purchase such insurance for the buyer. Reflecting the massive and
unpredictable nature of FCPA liability, however, the few FCPA-specific
insurance products explicitly exclude coverage for successor liability.222
Indemnification and escrow provisions theoretically could be used to allocate the parties’ risk, but the process of setting the ceiling for such provisions would be susceptible to the same price-setting problems seen in
estimating the liability.223 Moreover, the sensitivity of such provisions may
result in the parties walking away from deals that would otherwise be socially beneficial.224
4. In the Wake of Bestfoods, Does the Kimbell Foods Analysis Matter?
Each of the Kimbell Foods factors points towards the application of
state law as the rule of decision for any federal common law of successor
liability under the FCPA. Even assuming that they did not, however, it likely
would not change the substance of the ultimate rule of decision. There are
three potential sources of law for federal common law: (1) the law of a
particular state; (2) the law of the majority of the states; or (3) analogy to
other federal common law.225 In a case involving successor liability under
the FCPA, however, each of these sources of law likely would have the
same content.
First, assume that the Kimbell Foods test militates in favor of the incorporation of state law—what would be the result? In one of the earliest
rule would depress the price purchasers would be willing to pay for assets, as buyers would
risk acquiring massive hidden liability.”).
222
See Charles E. Leasure II, Insurance for FCPA Investigations, BLOOMBERG LAW,
Feb. 28, 2012, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/insurance-for-fcpa
-investigations/.
223
See Nat’l Servs. Indus., 352 F.3d at 694 (Leval, J., concurring) (“Nor is the unfairness that would result from the imposition of such capricious, arbitrary liabilities on innocent good faith purchasers nullified by the theoretical availability of insurance .... [A]n
arbitrary and unfair imposition of a substantial liability on a blameless party is no less unfair
or arbitrary (although less drastic) when its impact is dispersed by the insurance mechanism
among numerous blameless parties.”).
224
The Titan/Lockheed matter is a frequently cited example of potential FCPA liabilities torpedoing a deal. The government’s enforcement actions against The Titan Corporation (Titan) arose from the company’s agreement to be purchased by Lockheed Martin
Corporation (Lockheed). After Lockheed’s due diligence uncovered potential FCPA liabilities, it caused Titan to self-disclose its violations to the government before Lockheed
terminated the transaction “rather than subject[ing] itself to potential liability” for Titan’s
violations. See Grimm, supra note 28, at 306.
225
See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 886–87 (1986) (discussing mainstream academic thoughts on the
sources of federal common law).
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CERCLA successor liability cases, City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical
Co., the Sixth Circuit applied the law of the state of incorporation of the
“plaintiff and [defendant]” to the successor liability analysis.226 Taking a
slightly different tack in United States v. Davis, the First Circuit applied the
law of the state specified in the asset purchase agreement because the parties
assumed it would control.227 Apparently, the Sixth and First Circuits would
apply the law of a particular state, and, as previously discussed, most states
recognize only the traditional four exceptions to successor nonliability.228
Next, assume that the Kimbell Foods test indicates that a uniform federal common law applies. In New York v. National Services Industries, the
Second Circuit concluded that federal common law applied, but held that “the
substantial continuity doctrine is not part of general federal common law.”229
Even United States v. General Battery Corp., with its full-throated defense
of a uniform federal standard, stated—almost off-handedly—that “Bestfoods
held that CERCLA does not, sub silentio, abrogate fundamental common
law principles of indirect corporate liability.”230 Accordingly, “substantial
continuity” is untenable as a basis for successor liability under CERCLA.”231
And, as noted by the Sixth Circuit, there is a good argument that the substantial continuity exception is limited to labor and employment cases and
thus is not part of any general federal common law of successor liability, to
the extent such a thing exists.232 Accordingly, even under a “uniform federal
common law,” a federal court likely would not apply the substantial continuity exception to successor liability under the FCPA.233
Finally, perhaps neither the law of a particular state nor a standalone
federal common law should provide the rule of decision. In Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Brown & Bryant, the Ninth Circuit abstained
from deciding whether state or federal common law applied because, even
under federal common law, the content would have been derived from the
“traditional rules of successor liability in operation in most states.”234
226

43 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 1994).
261 F.3d 1, 54 (1st Cir. 2001).
228
See Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 337 Fed. App’x 480, 484 (6th Cir.
2009) (discussing the four exceptions to successor nonliability in Kentucky); see also
Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, 294 F.3d 640, 649 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that Florida
follows the general rule of successor nonliability); Eagle Pac. Ins. Co. v. Christensen Motor
Yacht Corp., 934 P.2d 715, 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that in Washington “a
corporation purchasing the assets for another is not liable for the seller’s debts”).
229
New York v. Natl. Serv. Indust., Inc., 352 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2003).
230
United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 309 (3d Cir. 2005).
231
Id. (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63–64 (1998)).
232
Mickowski v. Visi-Track Worldwide, LLC, 415 F.3d 501, 515 (6th Cir. 2005).
233
Griffith & Goutman, supra note 151, at 368.
234
159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1998).
227
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Because the “substantial continuity” exception is not the traditional rule of
successor liability in most states, the Ninth Circuit rejected its application.235 Thus, if the rule of decision for successor liability under the FCPA
comes from the general common law of the states, the substantial continuity
exception would be inapplicable.
In sum, regardless of how the Kimbell Foods test comes out, the result
will almost always be the same for arm’s-length asset purchasers: no substantial continuity exception, and thus no liability.
IV. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND CRIMINAL SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY UNDER THE FCPA
Even if an asset purchaser has no civil successor liability for the seller’s
violations of the FCPA, criminal successor liability poses an even greater
threat. As with civil successor liability, the text of the FCPA does not provide
for criminal successor liability.236 Assuming the rule of lenity applies, courts
should not use federal common law to create liability where Congress has
not provided for it explicitly.237
As many have noted, however, it cannot be assumed that the rule of
lenity will apply, even when a statute arguably is ambiguous or unclear.238
Thus, the rule of lenity may not reassure asset purchasers that a court would
not create and apply a common law of criminal successor liability. If it is
likely that a court would fashion a criminal common law of successor
liability for asset purchasers, the question again remains—what would the
content of that federal common law be?
A. Brief Review of the Law of Criminal Successor Liability
There is one published federal case that includes a passing reference to
criminal successor liability for an asset purchaser, although the decision is
devoid of analysis. In United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., the government
brought criminal Sherman Act charges against Ashland Oil, Inc. (AO) and
235

Id.
See Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28.
237
Cf. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 946 (1988) (concluding that, because
Congress did not explicitly provide for concept of psychological coercion to be included in
definition of “involuntary servitude,” rule of lenity mandated that defendants could not be
convicted on such a basis); United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (dismissing FCPA count based on rule of lenity).
238
See generally Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP.
CT. REV. 345, 346 (1994) (“Judicial enforcement of lenity is notoriously sporadic and
unpredictable.”).
236
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its wholly owned subsidiary, Ashland-Warren, Inc. (AWI).239 In 1968, AO
began operating a particular business line within its own company.240 In
July 1977, the business line engaged in a “massive, ongoing bidrigging
conspiracy.”241
In October 1977, AO transferred the assets and liabilities of the business line to its wholly owned subsidiary, AWI.242 Approximately two years
later, indictments were returned against both AO and AWI.243 AWI—the
subsidiary and asset purchaser—pleaded guilty. 244 Ashland Oil involves
AO’s subsequent motion to dismiss its indictment on double jeopardy
grounds.245 Unfortunately, there is no discussion of the basis for AWI’s
guilty plea.246 Based on the facts described in the order, however, AWI
likely could have been held liable under either the express assumption or
mere continuation exceptions to successor nonliability—assuming that such
exceptions apply in the criminal context.247 Accordingly, even Ashland Oil
does not support the imposition of criminal liability on a bona fide, arm’slength asset purchaser.248
In short, there are no cases decided by federal courts that meaningfully
analyze criminal successor liability for arm’s-length asset purchasers, and
the Resource Guide does not provide any cases supporting such a doctrine.249
239

537 F. Supp. 427, 428 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 429.
243
Id. at 428–29.
244
Id. at 428.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 427–29.
247
Id. at 430–31.
248
See also United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 937–38 (6th Cir. 1963). In Carter, the
Sixth Circuit considered the corporate criminal liability of a parent company and subsidiary,
where the acts giving rise to liability occurred before the parent company acquired all the
assets of the subsidiary. The Carter court reversed the conviction of the parent and concluded that the parent’s “acquisition [of its subsidiary] would not make it chargeable, as a
principal, for a crime previously committed by” its subsidiary or an employee of its subsidiary. Id. at 941. Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit did not clearly specify whether the parent’s
acquisition of its subsidiary’s assets was accomplished pursuant to an asset purchase or a
statutory merger.
249
See Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28 (collecting examples of criminal successor
liability for mergers, but not for asset purchases); Order Denying Respondents’ Motion for
Summary Decision, In re Sigma-Aldrich Bus. Holdings, Inc., No. 01-BXA-06 (U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce Bureau of Indus. & Sec. Aug. 29, 2002), available at https://www.bis.doc
.gov/enforcement/casesummaries/sigma_aldrich_alj_decision_02.pdf. Sigma-Aldrich, an
international trade regulations case, is occasionally cited as a potential analogy for criminal
asset purchaser liability in the FCPA context. In Sigma-Aldrich, an administrative law judge
used the federal rules of construction in 1 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5 (2012), to conclude that the Export
240
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This absence of criminal successor liability analysis comports with an
understanding of successor liability as a doctrine that is fundamentally remedial, not punitive.250 Proponents of civil successor liability often argue
that, absent imposition of successor liability, plaintiffs will be left without
a remedy for injuries that they have suffered.251 Theoretically, an innocent
asset purchaser is better able to mitigate its losses than a consumer injured
by a defective product. In criminal cases, however, this remedial policy carries less weight because criminal law is fundamentally punitive.252 Thus, it
is perhaps unsurprising that federal courts have not imposed criminal successor liability on asset purchasers.253
Administration Regulations’s reference to “person” included corporate successors, including asset purchasers.
For a thorough deconstruction of the Sigma-Aldrich order’s analysis, see Aaron Xavier
Fellmeth, Cure Without a Disease: The Emerging Doctrine of Successor Liability in International Trade Regulation, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 127, 145–49 (2006). As Professor Fellmeth
points out, a subsequent Supreme Court decision cast serious doubt on the use of the federal
rules of construction in the manner in which they apparently were used in Sigma-Aldrich.
See id. at 149 (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002)). Indeed, one of
the few cases applying 1 U.S.C. § 5 to successor liability has been overruled. See B.F.
Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 518–19 (2d Cir. 1996) (overruled as stated in New
York v. Nat’l Servs. Indus., Inc., 352 F.3d 682, 683 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Nelson, supra
note 130, at 558 (2006) (criticizing the use of 1 U.S.C. § 5 in the manner it was employed
in Sigma-Aldrich). Additionally, the government does not mention (much less rely upon)
Sigma-Aldrich in the Resource Guide as a basis for FCPA successor liability.
250
See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 781 F. Supp. 2d 677, 688
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that the punitive and “quasi-criminal” provisions of the federal
Clean Air Act precluded application of successor liability for an asset purchaser); EEOC
v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 193, 204 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The Court is
aware of only a few reported cases dealing with the issue of punitive damages in Title VII
actions involving successor liability, and all of them indicate that such damages are not appropriate against an innocent successor.”). But see, EEOC v. Steven T. Cox, Inc., No. 3:991184, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27160, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 19, 2002) (“Successor liability
includes liability for punitive damages, so long as punitive damages would be appropriate.”).
251
Matheson, supra note 83, at 407 (“A frequent justification courts use to support
successor liability is that manufacturers possess superior ability to bear the cost of injuries
resulting from product defects.”).
252
See Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 427 (2007) (“Criminal law, after all, is reserved for conduct
that we find so repugnant as to warrant the severest sanction. The goals of the criminal law
are to deter and punish such conduct.”). This is particularly true in FCPA prosecutions,
where money collected by the DOJ is rarely used to compensate victims. See William
Jacobson, FCPA Fines: Where Does All the Money Go?, TRACE BLOG (Feb. 13, 2009),
http://traceblog.org/2009/02/13/fcpa-fines-where-does-all-the-money-go/ (“In reality, all of
the fine money collected by the DOJ and the disgorgement and penalties assessed by the
SEC go right to the U.S. Treasury.”).
253
Imposing criminal successor liability also could conflict with the fundamental criminal requirements of mens rea and actus reus. See Weissmann & Newman, supra note
252, at 422 (“The current hornbook rule is that a corporation is liable for the actions of its

130

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:089

The mere fact that no federal court has ever analyzed criminal successor
liability does not, however, mean that prosecutors would not assert that it
exists. In principle, prosecutors could argue that federal common law provides for a theory of liability in criminal cases. As set forth below, however,
even assuming that the traditional, limited exceptions to successor nonliability could be applied through federal common law, it is unlikely that a
court would hold an asset purchaser criminally liable pursuant to the more
expansive, substantial continuity exception.
B. Finding a Rule of Decision for a Federal Criminal Common Law of
Successor Liability
Just as every discussion of federal civil common law begins with Erie,
every discussion of federal criminal common law begins with United States
v. Hudson & Goodwin, in which the Supreme Court stated: “Courts no doubt
possess powers not immediately derived from statute; but all exercise of
criminal jurisdiction in common law cases ... is not within their implied
powers.”254 But Hudson & Goodwin’s prohibition against federal criminal
common law has held up about as well as Erie’s.255 Even assuming that it
is within a court’s power to fashion a criminal common law of successor
liability, the court must then select the appropriate rule of decision.
As with civil common law, one could imagine the rule being provided
by a particular state’s law, by the law of the majority of the states, or by a
agents whenever such agents act within the scope of their employment and at least in part to
benefit the corporation.”); cf. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 1986)
(rejecting the substantial continuity exception in a civil case because it “brush[es] aside th[e]
bedrock requirement” of a causal relationship between a defendant’s acts and a plaintiff’s
injury thus “impos[ing] liability on entities which in fact had no connection with the acts
causing injury” (accord. Baker’s Carpet Gallery, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 942 F. Supp.
1464, 1472 (N.D. Ga. 1996))). With respect to mens rea, it would be odd to effectively
impute an agent’s state of mind to transferred assets—even assets such as goodwill and
brand—rather than to a specific corporate entity. Of course, this oddity is already present
in civil successor liability cases where the cause of action includes an intent element.
254
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); see also
Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1277 (2010)
(“If ‘federal general common law’ is unjustified in the civil law realm, it is even more unjustified in the criminal law context. All courts—not only federal courts—are obliged to
show restraint in the interpretation and application of criminal codes.”).
255
See Lisa Kern Griffin, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal Systems: The Federal
Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 1827 (2011) (“Numerous
scholars of criminal law have explained, however, that courts necessarily add meaning to
criminal statutes, and that the refrain against interstitial lawmaking relies on a ‘truth so
partial that it is nearly a lie.’” (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996)).
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true federal common law. Unlike the civil common law guideposts provided by the Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods, O’Melveny, Atherton,
Bestfoods, and other cases, the Court has not extensively discussed the
origins for the rule of decision in federal criminal common law issues,
though a relatively recent opinion provides at least some insight on the
Court’s views.256
In Dixon v. United States, the petitioner was convicted of purchasing
firearms while under indictment for a felony, in violation of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (the “Safe Streets Act”).257 At trial, the
petitioner asserted the defense of duress.258 The Safe Streets Act did not
provide for such a defense, however, and there is no other federal statute
that defines or even establishes the duress defense.259 The government acknowledged that the Safe Streets Act was subject to a common law duress
defense, but argued that the petitioner had the burden of proof, as is consistent
with the common law of affirmative defenses.260 The petitioner argued that
the government should bear the burden of proof.261
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens concluded that, in the face of
congressional silence, federal courts look to the common law as it existed at
the time of the statute:
Even though the Safe Streets Act does not mention the defense of duress,
we can safely assume that the 1968 Congress was familiar with both
the long-established common-law rule and the rule applied in McKelvey
[v. United States]262 and that it would have expected federal courts to apply
a similar approach to any affirmative defense that might be asserted as a
justification or excuse for violating the new law.263
256

Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006).
Id. at 3.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Brief for United States at 10–11, Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006) (No. 057053) (“Because the concept of a duress defense is deeply rooted in the common law, it
represents a background principle that may be read into federal criminal statutes absent a
contrary congressional intent .... But consistent with the common law and its underlying
policies, a defendant must bear the risk of non-persuasion of the issue of duress by
establishing that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Indeed, the government
also argued that recognizing common-law defenses is “at least in some tension with the
Court’s longstanding refusal to recognize common-law crimes,” and that the “invitations
to depart from the common-law nature of affirmative defenses should be viewed with
skepticism.” Id. at 15 n. 9. So too should invitations to depart from common law theories
of liability.
261
Dixon, 548 U.S. at 6.
262
260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922).
263
Dixon, 548 U.S. at 13.
257
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In short, the Dixon majority looked directly to the federal common law as
it existed at the time the statute was passed, without reference to subsequent developments.264
Application of the Dixon rule to criminal successor liability under the
FCPA would result in the recognition of, at most, only the traditional exceptions to successor liability. As an initial matter, it is not clear that there was
any federal common law rule of criminal liability for asset purchasers at the
time of the passage of the FCPA.265 Even assuming that Congress believed
that the “long-established common-law” exceptions to civil successor nonliability were equally applicable in criminal statutes, the substantial continuity exception and other modern innovations were not established fixtures
of the common law at the time the FCPA was enacted in 1977. As previously discussed, the substantial continuity exception was a deviation largely
restricted to federal labor and employment cases, as well as certain state law
products liability cases.266 Thus, even assuming that there is a criminal common law of successor liability under the FCPA, the substantial continuity
exception is not part of the doctrine.
C. A State Law Alternative to Dixon
Applying the Dixon rule to successor liability feels awkward, however.
Because corporations are inherently creatures of state law, it seems odd to
264

This was not the only approach the Court considered. In Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, he allowed for developments in federal common law, stating that courts can “assume
that Congress would not want to foreclose the courts from consulting ... newer sources and
considering innovative arguments in resolving issues not confronted in the statute and not
within the likely purview of Congress when it enacted the criminal prohibition applicable
in the particular case.” Id. at 17 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer’s dissent—which
obviously reached a different result than the majority—applied a rule similar to Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence: “Congress’ silence typically means that Congress expected the
courts to develop burden rules governing affirmative defenses as they have done in the past,
by beginning with the common law and taking full account of the subsequent need for that
law to evolve through judicial practice informed by reason and experience.” Id. at 20 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). Justice Alito provided yet another possibility in his concurrence: that common law rules that are not specifically addressed by Congress “remain where they were
when Congress began enacting federal criminal statutes.” Id. at 20 (Alito, J., concurring).
Clearly, however, none of these approaches looked to state law for the rule of decision.
265
See supra Part IV.
266
See C.T. Charlton & Assocs. v. Thule, Inc., No. 12-2619, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS
20393, at *5–6 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 2013) (explaining that the substantial continuity exception applies in a state law products liability context); see also Teed v. Thomas & Betts,
711 F.3d 763, 764 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that when a case concerns a violation of a
federal labor law or an employment statute, “a federal common law standard of successor
liability is applied”).
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assess corporations’ susceptibility to criminal indictment without reference
to the laws of the jurisdictions that establish them. Also, applying a purely
federal rule to the criminal common law analysis could, at least in theory,
create inconsistent results between civil and criminal actions brought pursuant to the same statute if state law supplies the rule of decision for civil
common law analysis.267
Furthermore, applying state law as the rule of decision for criminal
successor liability would be consistent with the approach taken by most of
the merger cases cited by the DOJ and the SEC in the Resource Guide268:
x

x

x

x

267

In United States v. Melrose Distillers, Inc., the Supreme
Court looked to Maryland law to conclude that dissolved
entities still “existed” within the meaning of the Sherman
Act and thus could not escape criminal liability for their
pre-dissolution conduct.269
In United States v. Polizzi, the Ninth Circuit incorporated
New York law for the definition of “corporation” when considering the criminal liability of a resulting post-merger entity
for the pre-merger conduct of one of the merged entities.270
In United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
used Oklahoma law to conclude that a merged entity had
“sufficient vitality to corporate life following dissolution to
subject the corporation to criminal prosecution.”271
In United States v. Shields Rubber, the Western District of
Pennsylvania looked to Pennsylvania law when considering
the criminal liability of a merged entity.272

See United States v. Cigarette Merchs. Ass’n, 136 F. Supp. 214, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (holding that merged corporation could be liable both criminally and civilly because, in part, limiting its liability to civil suits “would result in anomalous situations”);
cf. Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A single
statute with civil and criminal applications receives a single interpretation.”).
268
Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28.
269
359 U.S. 271, 272 (1959); cf. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 237 F. Supp.
885, 892 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (holding that an asset purchaser could not be held liable civilly
under a successor liability theory for the seller’s alleged Sherman Act violations). In
Johns-Manville Corp., the government brought a parallel criminal action, which named
the seller and its parent company, but not the buyer. Id. at 888.
270
500 F.2d 856, 906–09 (9th Cir. 1974) (“We turn to the New York law to determine
the effect of the merger in this case.”).
271
776 F.2d 1476, 1479 (10th Cir. 1985).
272
732 F. Supp. 569, 571–72 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (“Shields Rubber merged ... into
Shields Rubber II, and pursuant to 15 P.S. § 1907, Shields Rubber II remains liable for
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In the final case cited in the Resource Guide, United States v. Alamo
Bank of Texas, the Fifth Circuit considered whether a national banking
entity that merged into a state banking entity continued to exist for purposes of corporate criminal liability.273 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
federal, not state, law applied, but Alamo Bank cited directly to an applicable federal banking statute, 12 U.S.C. § 214b, to determine congressional
intent:
The franchise of a national banking association as a national banking
association shall automatically terminate when its conversion into or its
merger or consolidation with a State bank under a State charter is consummated and the resulting State bank shall be considered the same
business and corporate entity as the national banking association .... 274

Thus, Alamo Bank simply stands for the uncontroversial proposition that
where Congress speaks clearly, it can create successor liability.
In sum, federal courts have already shown a preference for referring to
state law when analyzing the criminal successor liability for merged entities.
Additionally, using state law as the rule of decision for a federal criminal
common law could reduce the risk of inconsistent results where civil common law also points to state law—such as for FCPA successor liability.
(Again, this assumes that there is any applicable doctrine of criminal successor liability for asset purchasers.)
In the end, however, choice of law likely does not matter to asset purchasers. Regardless of whether a court could select state law to supply the
rule of decision or, under Dixon, is required to apply federal common law
as it existed in 1977, at most, only the traditional exceptions to successor nonliability will apply.275 Accordingly, under either regime, an arm’s-length asset
purchaser likely has no liability for the pre-acquisition criminal conduct of
a seller.
CONCLUSION
Although a court probably would not find an asset purchaser liable for
the pre-acquisition FCPA violations of the seller, the Resource Guide contains no such assurances. By failing to specifically address asset purchases
in the Resource Guide, the DOJ and SEC seem to imply that, regardless of
all the liabilities including criminal liability, of the merged Shields Rubber Corporation.”
(emphasis added)).
273
880 F.2d 828, 829 (5th Cir. 1989).
274
Id. at 829 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 214b).
275
Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats, Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 649 (5th Cir. 2002).
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how the acquirer structures the transaction, it cannot ensure that the seller’s
FCPA civil and criminal liabilities will not transfer.276
Of course, the enforcers’ silence on the successor liability of asset purchasers may simply be because they have not had an appropriate opportunity to address the issue. Fortunately, that can be addressed easily through
the FCPA’s unique mechanism for seeking advisory opinions from the
DOJ. An acquirer considering purchasing assets from another company
that is subject to the FCPA can submit an Opinion Procedure request asking
the DOJ whether it would be liable for any pre-acquisition violations of
the seller.
Understandably, prospective buyers may be hesitant to disclose potential FCPA violations discovered during due diligence. Luckily, an acquirer
need not wait for such a discovery prior to requesting an Opinion Procedure
release, because the DOJ has already demonstrated a willingness to promulgate Opinion Procedure releases which show no evidence of a target having
violated the FCPA. For example, the government frequently cites Opinion
Procedure release 08-02 as a model for exemplary FCPA due diligence
and integration procedures in the acquisition context.277 The release does not
indicate that the requesting company had any evidence that the target had
actually violated the FCPA.278 To the contrary, the acquirer in Opinion
Procedure release 08-02 specifically advised the DOJ that it could conduct
only very limited due diligence on the target.279 Nonetheless, the DOJ provided an opinion regarding the transaction. Thus, it appears that the DOJ
should be willing to opine on the effect of an asset purchase structure on the
potential successor liability of the acquirer, even in the absence of facts
that suggest an FCPA violation by the seller.
Setting aside the legal analysis of this Article, as a matter of policy, the
government’s ability to enforce the FCPA would not be undermined if its
enforcement position included a general rule of successor nonliability for
asset purchasers. First, the government’s ability to bring enforcement actions against culpable individuals is, of course, unaffected by the rules of
successor liability. Second, the government often will have the option of
bringing an enforcement action against the seller, even if the seller has
276

Note, however, that the Resource Guide acknowledges that “[w]hether successor liability applies to a particular corporate transaction depends on the facts and the applicable
state, federal, and foreign law.” Resource Guide, supra note 1, at 28. Making room for
state—and even foreign—law seems to admit that reference to federal law is insufficient.
277
Id. at 29, 32, 62; FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION PROCEDURE
RELEASE 08-02, supra note 201.
278
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASE 08-02,
supra note 201.
279
Id.
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dissolved.280 Finally, even under the traditional rule of successor nonliability, purchasers will be incentivized to conduct due diligence and end corrupt
practices, in order to prevent the corrupt activity from continuing after the
acquisition closes. In short, the policies underlying the FCPA would not
be hindered significantly by adhering to a rule of successor nonliability for
asset purchasers. Moreover, if the DOJ acknowledged such a rule in an
Opinion Procedure release, it would provide meaningful reassurance and
guidance to many U.S. companies as the pace of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions quickens.

280

In Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the indictment
of a dissolved entity by relying on a Delaware statute which provided that dissolved corporations are amenable to suit for three years after dissolution. 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959).

